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ABSTRACT
Creditors have long understood that any claims they submit for repayment in a bankruptcy
might be valid, but subject to subordination in the order of payment of the bankruptcy estate’s
limited funds if the creditor behaved inequitably as the debtor failed. A groundbreaking opinion in
Enron’s on-going bankruptcy has expanded the practice of equitable subordination far beyond its
traditional reach. According to the court, buyers of bankruptcy claims are now subject to
subordination, not just for their own conduct, but also for conduct of previous owners of the claims,
regardless of whether the conduct related to the claims.
In a world of active bankruptcy claims trading, Enron raises powerful policy questions about
the legal rules governing property transfers that affect the doctrinal development of bankruptcy law
and the survival of a secondary market that provides important liquidity to other capital markets.
This article shows how Enron was erroneous from both doctrinal and policy perspectives and
examines the problems Enron has created for several distinct markets.
Enron is a reminder of the continuing value of negotiability in commercial contexts, for if the
claims involved had been negotiable, they could not have been subordinated. Thus, this article
considers what factors have traditionally determined when the law adopts a negotiability regime for
property transfers and whether these factors make sense in today’s financial markets. The article
argues that in the bankruptcy claims context, the liquidity benefits of negotiability outweigh its costs.
Accordingly, the article proposes a federal law of negotiability for bankruptcy claims to protect the
liquidity of this vital market.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy claims trading is the buying and selling by creditors of claims against a bankrupt
corporate debtor.1 Although it has gone largely unnoticed by courts and legal scholars, the growth of
bankruptcy claims trading has been the most important development in corporate reorganizations in
the past two decades. 2 Bankruptcy claims trading is now a major, although virtually unregulated,
financial industry.3 Specialized firms with expertise in valuing and diversifying the risk of investing
in bankrupt companies assist the largely institutional investors—hedge funds and investment
banks—who are active players in the claims market. Although the exact size of the corporate
bankruptcy claims trading market is unknown, it has been estimated to be in the hundreds of billions
of dollars about a decade ago, and has seen a prodigious growth in recent years.4
The growth of the bankruptcy claims trading market stems from the risks and delays inherent
in large Chapter 11 bankruptcies. Creditors can wait for years to receive a payout in a large Chapter
11 case, and the expected payout at the end is highly speculative. The ability to sell bankruptcy
claims provides an exit opportunity for creditors who do not wish to incur the hassle and expense of
the reorganization process.

The ability to buy bankruptcy claims provides non-creditors an

1

There is also a significant market in personal bankruptcy claims. Typically these claims are sold in bundles that include
claims against multiple debtors, such as the sale of a segment of a credit card company’s loan portfolio. The claim
buyers are not looking to purchase claims against any particular debtor, but are purchasing something more akin to a
fund of claims. There are unique policy considerations to personal bankruptcy claims trading that place it beyond the
scope of this article.
2
Glenn E. Siegel, Introduction, ABI Guide to Trading Claims in Bankruptcy: Part 2, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 177
(2003).
3
The sole industry-specific regulation is FED R. BANKR. P. 3001, which requires that proof of certain claims transfers be
filed with the court. Id.
4
E.g., Frederick Tung, Confirmation and Claims Trading, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1684, 1685 (1996) (noting estimate of the
claims trading market “as high as $300 billion.”); Robert K. Rasmussen and David A. Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis
of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 101 n.71 (1995); Robert D. Drain and Elizabeth J.
Schwartz, Are Bankruptcy Claims Subject to the Federal Securities Laws?, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 569, 569-70
(2002) (noting “formation of numerous distressed debt funds with assets in excess of $1 billion.”).
The seminal examination of bankruptcy claim trading can be found in Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers
Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1990), and its
sequels, Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Developments in Trading Claims and Taking Control of
Corporations in Chapter 11, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1991), and Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer,
Developments in Trading Claims: Participations and Disputed Claims, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 773 (1993).
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opportunity to invest in a debtor, influence the shape of a reorganization, and acquire control over
the debtor or particular assets of the bankruptcy estate.

Thus, creditors who seek to escape the

bankruptcy case with a certain payout can sell their claims against the debtor at a discount on the
expected value of a payout at the end of the case and transfer the risk on the payout to parties
interested in assuming the risk of an investment. The advent of widespread claims trading now
means that membership in the community of creditors may vary throughout a bankruptcy with
significant effects on parties’ negotiation leverage.
The existence of a large bankruptcy claims market has spillover effects on primary capital
markets, a phenomenon that has received scant attention. 5 Creditors’ ability to cashout at a certain
value rather than remain involved through the course of a bankruptcy and receive an uncertain
payout, increases their risk tolerance when originating loans, making equity investments, or
purchasing debt from other creditors. Creditors’ ability to assume more risk ultimately benefits
borrowers in the form of lower borrowing costs. The effect of the growth of the claims trading
market on reorganizations is the subject of much debate within the bankruptcy community,

6

but

there have been few legal decisions related to claims trading.
By far the most important rulings on claims trading to date have come from the on-going
Enron bankruptcy litigation.

Creditors have long understood that any claims they submit for

repayment in a bankruptcy might be valid, but nevertheless subject to subordination in the order of
payment from the bankruptcy estate’s limited funds, if the creditor behaved inequitably as the debtor
failed.

The practice of equitable subordination is intended to punish creditors who behaved

5

See Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 MICH. L. REV. 159 (1997) for a
discussion of the dynamics of the distressed debt market.
6
Compare Paul M. Goldschmid, Note, More Phoenix Than Vulture: The Case For Distressed Investor Presence in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization Process, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 191 (2005) (arguing for the positive role of distressed
debt investors in reorganizations) with Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt? 47 B.C.L. REV.
129 (2005) (criticizing the effects of distressed debt investors on the chapter 11 process); Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y.
Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization Remain a Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First
Century? 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 153 (2004) (same); Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases and the Delaware
© 2006, Adam J. Levitin
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inequitably; they should not be permitted to share pari passu with innocent creditors.
A quartet of recent opinions by the bankruptcy court in Enron has extended the practice of
equitable subordination far beyond its traditional limits of punishing an inequitable creditor.7 Enron
held that innocent buyers of bankruptcy claims are now subject to subordination, not just for their
own conduct, but also for conduct of previous owners of the claims, regardless of whether the
conduct was connected to the claims.
Enron created a new level of counterparty risk—the risk entailed by dealing with a particular
transaction partner—that is hard for claims purchasers to protect against through diligence, pricing,
warranties, or insurance. Enron makes buyers worry not just about sellers’ title, but also about
sellers’ interactions with the debtor unrelated to the claim. This increased counterparty risk raises
transaction costs, which will reduce the liquidity of the bankruptcy claims market. Because of the
unique position of the bankruptcy claims market as the residual capital market, a reduction in its
liquidity will reduce liquidity in other capital markets, making it more expensive for distressed
companies to raise capital and increasing the risk that those companies will default because they
have borrowed at more onerous rates.
Enron shows that commercial law has not kept pace with commercial developments like
claims trading and that essential commercial law concepts, like negotiability, need to be expanded
and revised to account for new types of markets. The problems in Enron speak to a fundamental
commercial law question about choice of property transfer rules.

Enron was based on the

commercial law principle of nemo dat quod non habet—you can transfer only what you have.8
Nemo dat means that defenses travel with property transfers, so if bankruptcy claims would be
Myth, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1987 (2002) (same), and with Tung, supra note 4 (considering the benefits and problems of
claims trading).
7
Enron Corp. v. Avenue Special Situations Fund II, LP (In re Enron Corp.), 333 B.R. 205, 211 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005);
Enron Corp. v. Springfield Assocs., LLC (In re Enron Corp.), No. 05-01025 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., Nov. 28, 2005); Enron
Corp. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. (In re Enron Corp.), No. 05-01074 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., Nov. 28, 2005); Enron Corp. v.
Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. (In re Enron Corp.), No. 05-01105 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., Nov. 28, 2005).
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subject to equitable subordination in the hands of a transferor, they should remain so in the hands of
a transferee.
Nemo dat is the default rule for property transfers, but there is a competing commercial law
paradigm: negotiability. Negotiability is usually thought of in terms of Uniform Commercial Code
Article 3, but it appears in other areas of law, including UCC Article 2 (sales),9 UCC Article 7
(warehouse receipts and bills of lading),10 UCC Article 8 (investment securities),11 and the law of
real estate mortgages and titles.12 The essential characteristic of negotiability is that only limited
defenses travel with property, so a transferee can receive more than the transferor had—a property
right free of certain defenses against its enforcement. This means that there is some level of
negotiability in any area of law with a good faith purchaser defense.
The great advantage of a negotiability regime is that it increases the liquidity of the debts it
covers, by lowering risks for debt buyers. This comes at the expense of greater risk for debts’
obligors, whose ability to defend against a debt depends on the identity of the party attempting to
enforce the claim. A negotiability regime, therefore, creates an opportunity for mischief, as a bad
actor can “wash” a debt that it could not enforce by selling it at full market value to a third party
against whom the obligor’s defenses would be cut off.
Historically, the law has differentiated between whether it adopts a nemo dat regime or a
negotiability regime based on whether transactions are commercial or consumer.13 Thus, intangible
legal claims for money—intangible choses in action—have been treated differently by law than
either tangible instruments or goods. This is because tangible instruments (and to a lesser extent
goods) were assumed to be commercial, while intangible choses in action were not; they were
8

Literally, no one can give that which he does not have.
UCC § 2-403(1) (1951); see also United States v. Lavin, 942 F.2d 177, 186 (3d Cir. 1991).
10
UCC § 7-502 (revised) (2005).
11
UCC § 8-303 (1995).
12
See Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1108 (1954).
13
Id. at 1068..
9
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assumed to be consumer debt.14
Accordingly, the good faith purchaser doctrine—a type of negotiability—historically
protected commercial purchasers, so that “commercial transactions [could] be engaged in without
elaborate investigation of property rights and in reliance on the possession of property by one who
offers it for sale or to secure a loan.”15 In contrast, the law protected consumer debtors from fraud
by allowing them to recover from the malfeasor.16 Thus, UCC Article 2 provides for good faith
purchaser protections for the sale of goods, a negotiability standard,17 but limits this to commercial
contexts.18
The law adopts negotiability as the rule for property transfers only when there is clear notice
given of the departure from nemo dat, typically in the form of the property itself or through a noticefiling system. Thus, UCC Article 3 requires that a debt be reified into an instrument that complies
with various formalities in order to be negotiable,19 while good faith purchaser defenses are available
for secured lenders and real estate purchasers because of the existence of notice-filing systems.20
Bankruptcy claims present a problem for the property type shibboleth. A bankruptcy claim is
an intangible chose in action. The Bankruptcy Code mandates the monetization of all non-monetary
claims on the bankruptcy estate.21 Intangible choses in action have traditionally been assumed to be
non-commercial.22 The problem is that bankruptcy claims are not like traditional intangible choses
in action. Instead, they have become sophisticated commercial investment vehicles, a development

14

Id.
Id. at 1057.
16
Id. at 1060.
17
UCC § 2-403(1) (1951).
18
UCC § 2-102 (1951).
19
UCC § 3-104 (1991). As codified in UCC § 3-104, the basic requirements of negotiability are a writing, containing an
unconditional promise to pay a sum certain in currency on demand or at a definite time, made out to order or bearer,
signed by the maker or drawer, and not containing promises other than inclusion of collateral, confession of judgment, or
certain waivers of law.
20
UCC § 9-322 (2001).
21
11 U.S.C. § 502(c)(2) (2006).
22
Gilmore, supra note 12, at 1068.
15
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that continues to cause unease within the bankruptcy community.23 The Enron decisions show that
the law of property transfers has not kept pace with commercial developments. It makes little sense
for property transfer paradigms developed in 18th century England to govern sophisticated 21st
century American commerce, and doing so has deleterious effects on the national economy.
This article argues that bankruptcy claims should be treated like other commercial
transactions because the social value of increased liquidity in the claims market outweighs the harm
of limited defenses. In particular, this article proposes a federal law of negotiability for bankruptcy
claims that would extend a presumption of good faith to most claims purchases without imposing the
high transaction costs of formalities or notice-filing. Such a rule would recognize the singular
importance of liquidity in the bankruptcy claims’ market as the residual capital market. Increased
liquidity in the claims market lowers the cost of borrowing outside of bankruptcy, a benefit to all
debtors, and cheaper borrowing decreases borrowers’ bankruptcy risk, which is a benefit that accrues
to all creditors.
The article begins by explaining the Enron decisions.

It then considers the doctrinal

problems of applying nemo dat to a situation involving the priority, rather than the validity of a debt.
Next, it examines how Enron’s application of nemo dat to a priority situation has impacted the
bankruptcy claims market. In light of the doctrinal and market problems with Enron, the article
argues in favor of applying a negotiability regime to bankruptcy claims trading and proposes a
general reconsideration of the rules governing what defenses travel with a property transfer in
commercial contexts.
II. THE ENRON EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION DECISIONS
In the spring of 2001, Enron was flying high. Creditors were willing to extend it multibillion dollar credit facilities. In May 2001, Enron entered into two loans, a $1.75 billion Long-Term
23

See supra note 6.
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Credit Agreement and a $1.25 billion Short-Term Credit Agreement.24 These loans were syndicated
among a number of banks, including Fleet Bank, Citibank, Credit Suisse First Boston, Deutsche
Bank, and Barclays Bank (“the Seller Banks”).25
By the end of 2001, Enron’s fortunes had plummeted amidst the exposure of a massive
accounting fraud, and Enron filed for bankruptcy in December 2001.26 Between August 2002, and
September 16, 2003, eleven distressed debt funds (“the Funds”) had purchased $268.75 million par
value of Enron bankruptcy claims that originated in the Seller Banks’ participation in the May 2001
credit agreements.27
On September 23, 2003, Enron commenced an adversary proceeding, known as the
“Megacomplaint,” against ten of the banks participating in the loans, including the Seller Banks.28
The Megacomplaint named the Seller Banks as defendants in voidable preference and fraudulent
conveyance claims arising from pre-paid forward transactions.29 The Megacomplaint also alleged
that the Seller Banks aided and abetted Enron’s accounting fraud to their advantage and that Enron’s
fraudulent financials induced other creditors to make unsecured loans to Enron they would not have
otherwise made.30 The Megacomplaint did not allege any wrongdoing in respect to the Credit
Agreements, however.31
In January 2005, Enron commenced four additional adversary proceedings, this time against
the Funds that had purchased the Seller Banks’ loan participation claims.32 Enron requested that the

24

Id.
Id. at 211-12. Fleet has since been acquired by Bank of America.
26
Id. at 211.
27
Id. at 212.
28
Id.
29
Id. A fraudulent conveyance is a transfer of the debtor’s property for inadequate consideration when the debtor is
insolvent or the transfer will render him so or made with the intent to hinder other creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2006). A
voidable preference is a transfer made by an insolvent debtor to a creditor during the statutory lookback period that is not
in exchange for contemporaneously extended new value and results in the creditor receiving more than he would in a
bankruptcy distribution. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2006).
30
Id. at 212-13.
31
Id. at 213.
32
Id.
25
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Bankruptcy Court equitably subordinate the Funds’ claims under 11 U.S.C. § 510(c).33

Section

510(c) provides:
Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section, after notice and a hearing, the
court may—
(1) under principles of equitable subordination, subordinate for purposes of
distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of another allowed
claim or all or part of an allowed interest to all or part of another allowed
interest; or
(2) order that any lien securing such a subordinated claim be transferred to the
estate.34
Enron’s complaint did not allege that the Funds had any knowledge of the Seller Banks’
alleged wrongdoing when they purchased the claims. The Funds filed a motion to dismiss under
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) and FED. R. BANKR. P. 7012(b), arguing that, as a matter of law, the Fleet
claims could not be subordinated in their hands.
On November 17, 2005, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Arthur Gonzalez denied the motion to
dismiss the equitable subordination action in the lead case, Enron Corp. v. Avenue Special Situations
Fund II, LP (“Enron”).35 Enron involved five Funds that held $47.25 million par value in claims
that originated in Fleet Bank’s $53.67 million participation in the Short-Term Credit Agreement.36
All five of the Funds purchased their claims from banks that had in turn purchased the claims from

33

Id. In the alternative, Enron requested that the court disallow the Funds’ claims under 11 U.S.C. § 502(d)
(2006), which provides:

the court shall disallow any claim of any entity from which property is recoverable under section 542,
543, 550, or 553 of this title or that is a transferee of a transfer avoidable under section 522(f), 522(h),
544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title, unless such entity or transferee has paid the amount, or
turned over any such property, for which such entity or transferee is liable under section 522(i), 542,
543, 550, or 553 of this title.
34
11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2006).
35
The Bankruptcy Court has since denied the Funds’ motion to dismiss Enron’s § 502 action. Enron Corp. v. Avenue
Special Situations Fund II, LP (In re Enron Corp.), 340 B.R. 180 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
36
333 B.R. at 212.
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Fleet.

37

One Fund also purchased a claim directly from Fleet.38 Eleven days later, in opinions

substantially similar to the lead case, Judge Gonzalez denied the parallel motions to dismiss in the
other three cases, which involved claims originating with Barclays, Citibank, CSFB, and Deutsche
Bank.39 For purposes of clarity, this article will refer solely to the lead, published case, but the
analysis applies equally to the companion cases.
Judge Gonzalez observed that there were three issues involved in the motion to dismiss: (1)
whether a claim could be equitably subordinated on account of its holder’s inequitable behavior
unconnected to the claim; (2) whether a claim that could be equitably subordinated in the hands of
the inequitable party could be subordinated in the hands of a transferee; and (3) whether a good faith
purchaser defense is available for a transferee of a bankruptcy claim.
Judge Gonzalez resolved the first issue in the affirmative. He concluded that:
equitable subordination is not limited to only those claims related to the inequitable
conduct that caused the injury to the creditor class. Rather, equitable subordination
can apply to claims unrelated to any inequitable conduct held by the claimant alleged
to have engaged in the conduct, limited by the amount of damages stemming from the
inequitable conduct that is not otherwise compensated to that class.40
Enron broke new ground on this issue, but did so on the basis of questionable authority.41 Fleet’s
allegedly inequitable behavior was unrelated to the credit agreement participation claims. Before
Enron, no court had held that claims of a non-fiduciary creditor could be subordinated on account of
the creditor’s unrelated inequitable conduct. To be sure, several cases have stated that subordination
need not be on account of behavior connected to the claim. These cases, however, either involved

37

Id. Among the intermediary financial institutions was Credit Suisse First Boston, which purchased and resold $29.5
million par value of Fleet’s participation in the credit agreements, as well as selling form its own share of the
syndication.
38
333 B.R. at 212.
39
Enron Corp. v. Springfield Assocs., LLC (In re Enron Corp.), No. 05-01025 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., Nov. 28, 2005); Enron
Corp. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. (In re Enron Corp.), No. 05-01074 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., Nov. 28, 2005); Enron Corp. v.
Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. (In re Enron Corp.), No. 05-01105 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., Nov. 28, 2005).
40
Enron, 333 B.R. at 210.
41
Adam J. Levitin, The Limits of Enron: Counterparty Risk in Bankruptcy Claims Trading, 15 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC.
389, 393-98 (2006).
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fiduciary creditors42 or made such statements in dictum.43 Moreover, there are rulings refusing to
subordinate creditors because the grounds for subordination were unrelated to the bankruptcy
claim.44 Enron expanded the doctrine of equitable subordination by holding that the claim of a nonfiduciary creditor could be subordinated on account of the creditors’ unrelated behavior.
As for the second issue, Judge Gonzalez concluded that nemo dat applied, so “the transfer of
a claim subject to equitable subordination does not free such claim from subordination in the hands
of a transferee. . . .

The remedy of equitable subordination remains with the claim.”45

As

transferees, the Funds took only as good as Fleet had held; the defenses traveled with the claim.
Accordingly, if it turned out that Fleet had acted inequitably, the Funds could be subordinated on
account of being transferees of Fleet’s claims. Enron thus announced that nemo dat would apply to
issues of priority, not just validity, in the transfer of bankruptcy claims. This too was a major
expansion of equitable subordination doctrine.
On the third issue, Judge Gonzalez concluded that the statutory good faith purchaser defense
in 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)46 was limited to 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)’s enumerated preference recovery, postpetition transfer, and fraudulent transfer actions.47 In any event, Judge Gonzalez held that the Funds
could not take in good faith because they were aware of the possibility of subordination by virtue of

42

Wilson v. Huffman (In re Missionary Baptist Found.), 818 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1987); L & M Realty Corp. v. Leo, 249
F.2d 668, 672 (4th Cir. 1957); In re Kansas City Journal-Post Co., 144 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1944); Taylor v. Standard Gas
& Elec. Co. (The Deep Rock Case), 305 U.S. 584 (1939).
43
Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 700 (5th Cir. 1977).
44
In re Ahlswede, 516 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir. 1975); Prudence Realization Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89 (1942).
45
Enron, 333 B.R. at 210.
46
11 U.S.C. § 550(a)-(b) (2006) provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a transfer is avoided under section 544, 545,
547, 548, 549, 553(b), or 724(a) of this title, the trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the
property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property, from—
(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made; or
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.
(b) The trustee may not recover under section (a)(2) of this section from—
(1) a transferee that takes for value, including satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt,
in good faith, and without knowledge of the voidability of the transfer avoided; or
(2) any immediate or mediate good faith transferee of such transferee.
47
Enron, 333 B.R. at 233.
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buying bankruptcy claims.48 By declaring it impossible to purchase a bankruptcy claim in good
faith, Enron confirmed that nemo dat is the principle governing every aspect of all bankruptcy claims
transactions because a nemo dat regime cannot recognize a good faith purchaser defense.
Enron is flawed from both doctrinal and policy perspectives and is cause to reexamine the
legal rules governing property transfers. The following section of this article probes the doctrinal
problems with Enron. The article then takes up Enron’s market problems, after which it turns to the
question of what legal rules should govern property transfers.
III. FINDING NEMO: THE DOCTRINAL LIMITS OF NEMO DAT
A. NEMO DAT: THE BASELINE RULE OF PROPERTY TRANSFERS
Nemo dat is the baseline rule of property transfers. Nemo dat means that a debtor has the
same defenses against its original creditor as it does against the creditor’s transferee. The transferee
takes only as good as the original creditor had.
The alternative rule to nemo dat is negotiability. Negotiation of a property right (typically a
debt) cuts off some of the debtor’s defenses. The debtor does not have as many defenses against a
transferee as it does against its original creditor in a negotiability system.

Therefore, the

enforceability of a debt depends on whether the original creditor or a transferee is enforcing it.
Another way to look at nemo dat and negotiability is in terms of what is being sold on the
originating market and on the resale market. In a nemo dat regime, the product sold in the resale
market is the same sold in the originating market plus the added risks of the originating buyer’s
malfeasance in the transaction. In a negotiability regime, the same product is being sold in the resale
market and the originating market.
The implications of these competing paradigms are well-known.

A debtor is likely to

demand a discount of issuing a negotiable instrument because it is surrendering rights. Negotiability
48

Id. at 235.
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does not cut off any defenses the debtor has against the original creditor, but the original creditor still
benefits because a negotiable debt is easier to resell. Debt purchasers are willing to pay more for a
negotiable debt because they do not have to worry about whether there are defenses to the debt
beyond those involving the legitimacy of the instrument into which the debt is reified. Accordingly,
negotiable systems have greater resale liquidity than nemo dat systems.
Expressed graphically, assuming that supply and demand in the debt resale market are price
sensitive, the demand curve in a debt resale market shifts to the right in a negotiable system,
resulting in an increased quantity of transactions and at a higher price. The increased number of
transactions from a rightward shift of the demand curve shows the increased liquidity in the resale
market (QNegotiability – QNemo dat):
Graph 1: Increase in Resale Market Transactions Between Nemo Dat and Negotiability
P

S

DNegotiability
DNemo dat

QNemo dat QNegotiability

Q

Debtors are not unprotected in negotiable systems. They are able to protect themselves exante via pricing, as debtors should demand a discount from creditors for issuing them negotiable
debt. Debtors are also able to protect themselves ex-post via litigation. If the original creditor
fraudulently induced the debtor into issuing a debt, the debtor could raise fraudulent inducement
only as a defense against the original creditor, not that creditor’s transferee. But after the transferee
collected on the fraudulently induced debt, the debtor could sue the original creditor for its loss.
This places an affirmative litigation burden on the debtor, and makes the debtor assume its original
© 2006, Adam J. Levitin
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creditor’s credit risk in the even that a transferee enforces a claim that would be barred but for
negotiability. Whether this matters depends on the particulars of the parties, especially the debtor’s
ability to bear litigation burdens and the original creditor’s solvency.
While negotiability increases the liquidity of the resale market, its net effect of negotiability
on liquidity in the debt origination market is indeterminate in the abstract. In a negotiable system,
sellers (borrowers) will demand a higher price (an interest rate discount) for their product (debt).
Assuming that supply and demand in the lending market are price sensitive, this means that the
supply curve in originating markets shifts leftward in a negotiable system, which will mean that there
are fewer transactions and at a higher price. The reduced number of transactions represents a
decrease in the liquidity of the originating market, as indicated by the shaded area (QNemo

dat

-

QNegotiability):
Graph 2: Decrease in the Number of Transactions in the Debt Origination Market from shift
from Nemo Dat to Negotiability, When Only Sellers Are Considered
P

S Negotiability

SNemo dat

D
QNegotiability

QNemo dat

Q

The decrease in liquidity in the originating market caused by borrowers demanding a
discount is not the whole story. Whereas the net price for a borrower is the price of the loan, the net
price for a lender is the price of making the loan minus the resale price. This means that borrower’s
leftward shift of the supply curve will be offset to some degree by a rightward shift of the demand
curve (from D1 to D2) due to lenders’ ability to offset higher costs of lending due to negotiability
© 2006, Adam J. Levitin
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with increased resale prices.
The net effect of the leftward shift of the supply curve and the rightward shift of the demand
curve in the originating market cannot be determined in the abstract. It could result in either greater
or lesser liquidity in the originating market, but most likely at a higher price point (lower cost of
borrowing) in either case.
Thus, it is possible for there to be a net loss in liquidity, represented by the striped area, if
QNemo dat > QD2:
Graph 3: First Possible Effect on Debt Originating Market from Shift Between Nemo Dat to
Negotiability
P

S Negotiability
SNemo dat

D2
D1
QD1

QD2

QNemo dat

Q

Alternatively, it is possible for there to be a net gain in liquidity, represented by the striped area, if
QD2 > QNemo dat:
Graph 4: Second Possible Effect on Debt Originating Market from Shift Between Nemo Dat to
Negotiability
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This story is also likely to be complicated by idiosyncratic valuation as between debtors and
creditors. Debtors are likely to place a higher value relative to creditors on price changes and a
lower value on retention of defenses. Debtors enjoy a price discount immediately. The retention of
defenses will be enjoyed in the future, if at all. Moreover, if the retained defense can only be used in
bankruptcy, debtors’ relative valuation will tilt even more strongly in favor of a presently enjoyable
discount. Borrowers tend to have an optimism bias; they do not think it likely that their ventures will
end up in bankruptcy. Debtors also know that management and ownership are likely to change in
bankruptcy. Therefore neither present management nor present ownership will place much value on
the retention of a bankruptcy-only defense.
In contrast, creditors place higher value on bankruptcy rights because when calculating the
credit risk on a loan, they need to account for the minimum possible recovery, which will be the
result of their position in bankruptcy. While creditors enjoy a higher lending price immediately
under a nemo dat regime compared to a negotiability regime, it comes at the expense of increased
default risk for the loans. Negotiability, on the other hand, does not cut off any defenses as against
an originating creditor, but it does increase the resale value of the debt, which can be enjoyed almost
immediately. The increased liquidity from negotiability allows creditors the comfort of easier resale.
The usual policy choice, then, about whether to adopt a negotiability regime involves
© 2006, Adam J. Levitin
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weighing the social benefit of increased liquidity in the resale market with effects on liquidity in the
originating market. The weighing of the market impacts will also depend on the identity of the
market players are and debtors’ ability to price for negotiability and litigate against originating
creditors in a negotiability regime.
To illustrate, imagine that in a negotiability system, a consumer buys a refrigerator on an
installment contract from a dealer, and the dealer immediately resells its rights under the installment
contract to a finance company.49 If the refrigerator does not work and the consumer does not pay,
the consumer will have a breach of warranty defense against any attempt by the dealer to collect on
the installment contract. The consumer would not have that defense against the finance company’s
collection action.
Of course, the consumer could have demanded a sufficient discount at point of sale, but
consumers are not skilled at pricing for negotiability, lack the requisite information to do so, and
may not even know that they should. Alternatively, the consumer could sue the dealer, but the
consumer is ill-suited to bear the litigation burden. Even if the consumer has the resources to bring
suit, there is no guarantee that the dealer is solvent or isn’t fly-by-night. Concern for consumers in
this sort of situation has led to the Federal Trade Commission’s Holder in Due Course Rule, which
allows consumers in credit contracts for the sale or lease of goods or services to assert all the
defenses and claim that they could against the seller against a holder in due course of their debt.50
When the debtor is not in a good position to protect himself, as in consumer cases, negotiability is a
poor policy choice. But where debtors are able to protect themselves, negotiability bestows the
benefits of resale liquidity on markets.
The evaluation of the policy choice between nemo dat and negotiability changes is

49

This scenario is derived from Albert J. Rosenthal, Negotiability—Who Needs It?, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 379-380
(1971).
50
16 C.F. R. § 433.2 (2006).
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complicated in bankruptcy because the debtor is no longer the real party in interest, as much as
competing creditors are. In bankruptcy, not just a debt’s validity, but also its priority are at issue.
B. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CLAIM PRIORITY AND CLAIM VALIDITY
Traditionally, nemo dat has only been applied to questions of a debt’s validity.

The

Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts expresses the nemo dat principle as:
(1) By an assignment the assignee acquires a right against the obligor only to the
extent that the obligor is under a duty to the assignor; if the right of the assignor
would be voidable by the obligor or unenforceable against him if no assignment had
been made, the right of the assignee is subject to the infirmity.
(2) The right of an assignee is subject to any defense or claim of the obligor which
accrues before the obligor receives notification of the assignment, but not to defenses
or claims which accrue thereafter except as stated in this Section or as provided by
statute.51
An assignee takes cum onere and is subject to all the defenses that an debtor could raise against the
assignor that have accrued at the time the debtor received notice of the assignment.
Similarly, UCC Article 9, which governs secured transactions adopts nemo dat, in regard to
the enforceability of a security interest against the debtor. UCC § 9-318(1) provides that:
. . . the rights of an assignee are subject to
(a) all the terms of the contract between the account debtor and assignor and
any defense or claim arising therefrom; and
(b) any other defense or claim of the account debtor against the assignor
which accrues before the account debtor receives notification of the
assignment.52
UCC § 9-318(1) mirrors the Restatement’s formulation of nemo dat. Again, nemo dat is expressed
as applying only to the rights of an assignee in a security agreement between the debtor and a
creditor-assignor. It is not expressed in terms of priority among creditors.
51

Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts § 336(1)-(2) (1981). Compare Restatement (First) of the Law of
Contracts, § 167(1) (1962) (“An assignee’s right against the obligor is subject to all limitations of the obligee’s right . . .
provided that such defenses . . . are based on facts existing at the time of the assignment, or are based on facts arising
thereafter prior to knowledge of the assignment by the obligor.”).
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The major innovation in Enron was to apply nemo dat to a question of equitably determined
priority, rather than in its traditional context of a question of validity or statutorily determined
priority. There are different factors involved in questions of priority and validity. Likewise, there
are differences between priority set before a transaction and priority set afterwards. The validity of a
debt is a bilateral issue between a creditor and a debtor, whereas the priority is a multilateral issue
between creditors of the same debtor. A debt’s priority can be set ex-ante, by statute, by perfection
of a security interest, or by a contractual subordination agreement. It can also be set ex-post by
equitable subordination. Enron did not properly account for these differences, which are crucial
determinates of choice of property transfer law.
Nemo dat is designed to protect debtors. Under nemo dat, the defenses available to a debtor
do not vary, regardless of whether it is the original creditor or that creditor’s transferee that attempts
to enforce the debt. Concern over the protection of debtors is an issue that animates nemo dat in a
validity context because validity of a debt is an issue between the debtor and a creditor.
Priority, in contrast, is an issue among creditors.

When creditors’ claims can only be

satisfied from a limited fund, the order in which their claims are satisfied is of no legal concern to the
debtor.53 Nemo dat protects creditors in a priority context from valid claims receiving improved
priority in the hands of transferees. This protection is justified only to the extent that a creditor has
relied on other creditors’ priority in its lending decisions. Therefore, if a creditor lends with the
assumption that it will be last in line in a bankruptcy distribution, it does not merit the protections of
nemo dat.
Bankruptcy is a multi-party proceeding in which creditors are typically competing with each
other for recoveries from a limited (and usually inadequate) fund, so the relative priority of their

52

UCC § 9-318(1) (2001).
When creditors’ claims can be satisfied from multiple, overlapping assets, the debtor has an interest in the distribution,
and is protected by the doctrine of marshalling.

53
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claims crucial. If a creditor’s claim is elevated in priority, it will increase his recovery and decrease
other creditors’ recoveries. As formulated in the Restatement, nemo dat deals only with the defenses
of an debtor against a claim in the hands of an assignee. In this formulation, the principle has little
bearing on Enron. In Enron, the issue was not the rights of the assignee Funds vis-à-vis the debtor,
Enron, but vis-à-vis other creditors.
Defenses may travel with a claim, but equitable subordination is not a defense against a
claim; it does not affect a claim’s validity. A subordinated claim is still valid and enforceable
against the debtor, just as an unperfected security interest is enforceable against the debtor,54 even if
neither affects priority vis-à-vis third parties. Subordinated claims still vote and remain eligible for
sharing in a distribution, and their holders still have standing to litigate issues, unlike a party with a
disallowed claim.55 Subordinated claims, unlike disallowed claims, still have a seat at the table, even
if they are the last to eat and nothing may be left for them. Subordination affects rights only vis-àvis other creditors.
Functionally, to be sure, priority is often a proxy for validity. In a Chapter 11 case, the plan
often provides that there will be no distribution to any class with lower priority than the general
unsecured creditors, and subordinated claims are typically inferior to general unsecured claims. Yet
subordination and disallowance should not be conflated simply because they may have a similar
effect. They are different legal processes. A valid claim may be subordinated, and a claim may be
disallowed even though it could not have been subordinated, for example, a claim that is not timely
filed with the court or a claim based on a disputed debt that is resolved in favor of the bankruptcy
estate. Whether equitable subordination and disallowance have the same effect on distribution
depends on the assets of the estate, not on any legal principle. If an estate turns out to be solvent,

54

UCC § 9-203 (2001).
See Daniel C. Cohn, Subordinated Claims: The Classification and Voting Rights Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 293, 308-11 (1982).
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subordinated claims will be paid in full. Although such cases are the exception, they are illustrative
of the nature of equitable subordination.
Nor is subordination necessarily complete. Section 510(c) does not require that subordinated
claims have inferior status to all claims.56 Thus, there could be a partial or even full recovery on a
subordinated claim even if the debtor is not solvent at the time of distribution. In contrast, there is
no recovery possible on a disallowed claim. Although equitable subordination often has the same
effect as claim disallowance, they are different remedies that operate on different principles.
It might be argued that issues of priority cannot be separated from issues of validity because
they representative of the bankruptcy estate—the trustee or debtor in possession (DIP)—is a
fiduciary of the creditors. The dual roles of trustee or DIP as representative of the estate and
representative of the creditors do not mean that a validity analysis should be applied to questions of
priority. A debt’s priority as a result of equitable subordination does not affect a trustee or DIP in its
role as representative of the creditors because equitable subordination presents trustees or DIPs with
a conflict of interest between different fiduciary obligations.
Trustees and DIPs owe fiduciary duties to the estate57 and to the unsecured creditors58
because the trustee (or DIP) acts as their representative.59 The fiduciary duties owed to the estate
require the trustee or DIP to maximize the estate’s value by recovering preferences and fraudulent
conveyances.60 Equitable subordination, in contrast, does not increase the size of the estate. Instead,
equitable subordination actions typically present the trustee or DIP with a conflict of fiduciary
duties.
56

Enron, 333 B.R. at 217-18.
See 11 U.S.C. § 323 (2006).
58
See, e.g., Coleman v. Cmty. Trust Bank (In re Coleman), 426 F.3d 719, 729 (4th Cir. 2005); In re Mushrooms Transp.
Co., 382 F.3d 325, 339 (3d Cir. 2004); Commodore Int’l Ltd. v. Gould (In re Commodore Int’l Ltd.), 262 F.3d 96, 98 (2d
Cir. 2001); Peterson v. Scott (In re Scott), 172 F.3d 959, 967 (7th Cir. 1999); In re Marvel Entm’t Group, Inc., 140 F.3d
463, 474 (3d Cir. 1998).
59
Koch Refining v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 831 F.2d 1339, 1342-43 (7th Cir. 1987)
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The trustee or DIP owes fiduciary duties equally to all its creditors.

But equitable

subordination does not benefit all unsecured creditors equally.61 Equitable subordination litigation
brought by the trustee or DIP comes at the expense of all unsecured creditors, but the benefits do not
accrue to all unsecured creditors equally.
The conflict of interest is underscored by the comparison of equitable subordination with
fraudulent conveyance and voidable preference actions. The Supreme Court has held that a trustee is
subrogated to all individual creditors’ rights to bring fraudulent conveyance actions.62 The trustee
must act for the benefit of all creditors equally, however. This is not a problem in fraudulent
conveyance actions because the recovered transfer goes to the bankruptcy estate and thus benefits all
creditors. There is no equivalent holding for equitable subordination because § 510(c) permits
subordination to benefit select creditors by allowing subordination to be partial, rather than complete
demotion.63 If the subordinated party remains less than fully subordinated, then no party of lower
priority has benefited from the subordination. Even when subordination is complete, it does not
benefit all creditors, except in the unusual situation in which the subordinated party had higher
priority than all other creditors.
When a DIP seeks equitable subordination, it is not acting in the interests of all unsecured
creditors or the estate as a whole. Instead, it is forcing some creditors to shoulder the cost of a
benefit that will accrue only to other creditors. This is not the mere exercise of business judgment
and is barred by the Supreme Court’s decision in Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. of New

60

See, e.g., Coleman, 426 F.3d at 729; Mushrooms, 382 F.3d at 339; Commodore, 262 F.3d at 98; Peterson, 172 F.3d at
967; Marvel Entm’t, 140 F.3d at 474.
61
In re Vitreous Steel Prods. Co., 911 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1990).
62
Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
63
11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2006). The distinct treatment of fraudulent conveyances and equitable subordination has been
criticized. See David Gray Carlson, The Logical Structure of Fraudulent Transfers and Equitable Subordination, 45
WM. & MARY L. REV. 157 (2003) (arguing that both types of actions should be viewed in terms of effecting a transfer to
the injured creditors). But see Adam J. Levitin, “Rough Justice? The Nature of Equitable Subordination and Problems
of Constitutional Standing,” working paper, May 11, 2006, at 16 n.66, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=900444.
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York, which held that a trustee cannot prosecute claims that belong to only a subset of creditors.64
Indeed, it is debatable whether trustees and DIPs even have Constitutional standing to bring
equitable subordination actions.65 The interest of a trustee or DIP in ensuring a fair distribution does
not turn questions of priority—the relationship among creditors—into one of validity—the
relationship between a creditor and the debtor.
Enron wrongly conflated questions of priority and validity in its consideration of whether to
apply nemo dat. Goldie v. Cox,66 the case that Enron cited for the principle that “transferees should
[not] enjoy greater rights than the transferor,”67 was a validity case, not a priority case. In Goldie,
the bankrupt had a DIP account with a creditor.68 The creditor sold all of his bankruptcy claims held
as of a certain date.69 The creditor continued to lend to the bankrupt, and the bankrupt made
payments on his account to the assignor.70 The bankruptcy referee had held that, under a FIFO
repayment principle, the bankrupt’s payments should be credited to the earlier accrued assigned
account first, and that the bankrupt’s payments had paid off the assigned debt.71 Accordingly, the
referee disallowed the assignee’s claim.72 The assignee did not appeal.73 The Eighth Circuit dealt
with the issue in superficial dictum, noting that “there is no point in examining this matter.”74 The
Eighth Circuit agreed with the referee’s ruling, and noted that if all the claims were still held by the
assignor, the payments would have been first credited to the oldest debts, so the assignee should fare

64

406 U.S. 416 (1972). See also E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., v. Hadley, 901 F.2d 979 (11th Cir. 1990); Williams v. Cal.
First Bank, 859 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Ozark Restaurant Equip. Co, 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1987).
65
Levitin, supra note 63, at 15-21. This is not to say that DIPs do not have a strategic interest in the order of priorities.
A creditor’s priority affects its leverage with the estate in negotiating DIP operations and negotiating a plan, and a DIP
may want to favor certain creditors in order to curry post-bankruptcy relationships. Id. at 14-15.
66
135 F.2d 695, 720 (8th Cir. 1942).
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Enron, 330 B.R. at 223.
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Goldie, 135 F.2d at 720.
69
Id.
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likewise.75
There was no subordination issue in Goldie; the question was of claim allowance. Goldie
does not tell us that the Funds should have been subordinated in Enron. Claim allowance is an issue
of validity, not priority, and falls squarely within the traditional ambit of nemo dat. Whether nemo
dat should be extended to priority is a more complex issue.

IV. SHOULD NEMO DAT APPLY TO BANKRUPTCY CLAIMS’ PRIORITY?
A. NEMO DAT IS CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY
1. Why the Principles of Equity Matter
Any attempt to answer whether nemo dat should apply to priority resulting from equitable
subordination should begin with the text of § 510(c). Section 510(c) provides that, after notice and a
hearing, the court may:
Under principles of equitable subordination, subordinate for purposes of distribution
all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of another allowed claim or all or part of
an allowed interest to all or part of another allowed interest . . ..76
While “equitable” is often used in the Bankruptcy Code as a synonym for “fair” or “just,”77 it
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Id.
11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2006).
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See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(5) (2006) (trustee is to perform all obligations of the debtor on an unexpired lease of personal
property unless court decides otherwise “based on the equities of the case.”); 11 U.S.C. § 502(j) (2006) (reconsideration
of allowed or disallowed claim is to be made “according to the equities of the case”); 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (2006)
(claims may be subordinated “under principles of equitable subordination”); 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(III) (2006)
(asbestos channeling injunction may only be issued if pursuit of claims outside of plan would likely threaten “plan’s
purpose to deal equitably with claims and future demands”); 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii) (2006) (injunction issued in
conjunction with chapter 11 plan only if “the court determines. . .such injunction. . .is fair and equitable”); 11 U.S.C. §
524(h)(1)(A) (2006) (referencing the “fair and equitable” requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)); 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)
(2006) (after acquired property clauses in security agreements are valid except to the extent that the court orders
otherwise after notice and a hearing “based on the equities of the case.”); 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (2006) (limitation on
post-petition effect of after-acquired property clauses of security agreements to be “based on the equities of the case”);
11 U.S.C. § 557(d)(2)(D) (2006) (disposition of grain or proceeds of grain may be by “such other method as is equitable
in the case”); 11 U.S.C. § 723(d) (2006) (determination of distribution of surplus recovered by a partnership trustee
against general partners shall be equitable); 11 U.S.C. § 1112(d)(3) (2006) (conversion of case from chapter 11 to
chapter 12 must be equitable); 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (2006) (debtor rejecting a collective bargaining agreement
shall make a proposal for modifications in employee benefits and protections that assures that “all creditors, the debtor,
and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably”); 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(3) (2006) (collective bargaining
agreements to be rejected only if “the court finds. . .the balance of the equities favors rejection”); 11 U.S.C. §
1114(f)(1)(A) (2006) (debtor modifying retiree benefits must assure that “all creditors, the debtor, and all of the affected
parties are treated fairly and equitably”); 11 U.S.C. § 1114(g)(3) (2006) (modification of payment of retiree benefits if
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has a particular meaning in § 510(c), as indicated by the phrase “principles of equitable
subordination.”
As the legislative history of § 510(c) makes clear, the “principles of equitable subordination”
is a term of art referring to historic Anglo-American traditions of courts of equity, and subordination
of claims in bankruptcy must be viewed in light of these traditions. Although bankruptcy courts are
often called “courts of equity,” this is an inaccurate description because bankruptcy courts lack
classic equity powers and jurisdiction.78
Section 510(c) is an exception, where traditional equity jurisprudence plays a role in
bankruptcy. The Senate Report of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, which enacted § 510(c),
noted that:
The bill provides, however, that any subordination ordered under this provision must
be based on principles of equitable subordination. These principles are defined by
case law, and have generally indicated that a claim may normally be subordinated
only if its holder is guilty of misconduct. As originally introduced, the bill provided
specifically that a tax claim may not be subordinated on equitable grounds. The bill
deletes this express exception, but the effect under the amendment should be much
the same in most situations since, under the judicial doctrine of equitable
subordination, a tax claim would rarely be subordinated.79
Similarly, the House Report noted that § 510(c) permits the subordination of claims and
interests on equitable grounds:

“all creditors, the debtor, and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably, and [a modification of the order]
is clearly favored by the balance of the equities”); 11 U.S.C. § 1114(l) (2006) (court may reinstate retiree benefits that
have been modified unless the equities favor modification); 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2006) (cramdown plan must be “fair
and equitable” to be confirmed); 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (2006) (defining what “fair and equitable” includes for the
purposes of § 1129(b)(1)); 11 U.S.C. § 1170(e)(1) (2006) (approval of abandonment of railroad line requires “a fair
arrangement at least as protective of the interests of employees as that established under section 11326(a) of title 49”); 11
U.S.C. § 1172(c)(1) (2006) (approval of railroad reorganization plan requires “a fair arrangement at least as protective of
the interests of employees as that established under section 11326(a) of title 49”). See also 11 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(1)
(2006) and 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b)(1) (2006) (“circumstances for which the debtor should not justly be held accountable”
for failure to make payments under a plan); 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(3)(B) (2006) and 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(6)(A)(i) (2006) (no
“undue hardship”); 11 U.S.C. § 557(f)(1) (2006) (“in the interests of justice”). Many historically equitable doctrines,
such as good faith, see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2006), fraud, see 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2006), and laches, see 11 U.S.C. § 524
(2006), are incorporated throughout the Code, but without allowing judicial discretion.
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BANKR. L.J. 1, 24 (2006). See also Marcia Krieger, “The Bankruptcy Court is a Court of Equity”: What Does that
Mean? 50 S.C. L. REV. 275 (1999).
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this section is intended to codify case law . . . and is not intended to limit the court’s
power in any way. The bankruptcy court will remain a court of equity . . . . The
court’s power is broader than the general doctrine of equitable subordination, and
encompasses subordination on any equitable grounds.80
While the House Report stated that § 510(c) power is broader than the general doctrine, it did
not spell out how it is broader, as pre-existing equitable subordination doctrine appears to have
allowed subordination for any sort of inequitable behavior; there are not exceptions evident in
caselaw.
Finally, the legislative history includes statements by the legislative leaders on the
Bankruptcy Reform Act, Representative Don Edwards (D-Cal.) and Senator Dennis DeConcini (DAriz.). They observed that § 510(c)
is intended that the term “principles of equitable subordination” follow existing case
law and leave to the courts development of this principle. To date, under existing law,
a claim is generally subordinated only if holder of such claim is guilty of inequitable
conduct, or the claim itself is of a status susceptible to subordination, such as a
penalty or a claim for damages arising from the purchase or sale of a security of the
debtor. The fact that such a claim may be secured is of no consequence to the issue of
subordination. However, it is inconceivable that the status of a claim as a secured
claim could ever be grounds for justifying equitable subordination.81
Several points are apparent from the legislative history.

First, Congress intended for

equitable subordination to occur under equitable principles. Second, Congress understood these
principles to be those that existed in pre-Code caselaw. Third, Congress understood that these
principles typically require the holder, rather than the transferor, of the claim to be guilty of
misconduct.82 The exception to this principle is when the nature of the claim itself is inequitable, but
Congress wanted to be clear that there was nothing per se inequitable about taxes or secured

80

H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 359 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6315.
124 Cong. Rec. H11089 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6436,
6452 (1978); 124 Cong. Rec. S17406 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini), reprinted in 1978
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claims.83 While it is not clear what sort of claim would be per se inequitable, one suspects that it
might include claims that are “contrary to public policy” or somehow categorically disfavored, like
punitive damages or penalties. The Supreme Court, however, has since held that types of claims
may not be categorically subordinated,84 because doing so would infringe on Congress’ priority
scheme.85 In any case, neither the basic principle nor the exception existed in Enron.
The statements of the legislative leaders add a twist.86 They noted courts were to develop the
law of equitable subordination. That is, equitable subordination need not remain frozen in its 1978
state;87 federal common lawmaking is explicitly authorized.88 But there are clearly limits placed by
the text of § 510(c), particularly that the development must be within the principles of equitable
subordination. The legislative history does not contemplate a free license to subordinate claims and
interests whenever it suits a judge. The subordination must bear some relation to what is equitable.
Examples of how the law could develop beyond its state in 1978 within the realm of equity
might be the subordination of claims for parties that did not commit the inequitable conduct, but
were aware of it, had a duty to report or prevent it, and failed to do so. This might include an
attorney who failed to go up the ladder to report a fraud. Another possibility of development within
the bounds of equity would be the subordination of a claim by a party who would be liable to the
debtor under a gross negligence standard, but only committed simple negligence. Thus, it might be
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proper to subordinate the indemnification claim of a negligent officer or director against a
corporation whose charter provides for officer and director indemnification except in cases of gross
negligence or willful misconduct. The corporation would still indemnify the officer or director, but
the priority of the claim would be lower.
The limitation of equitable principles on the development of equitable subordination is
confirmed by the identical statements of Representative Edwards and Senator DeConcini that, “Since
the House amendment authorizes subordination of claims only under principles of equitable
subordination, and thus incorporates principles of existing case law, a tax claim would rarely be
subordinated under this provision of the bill.”89 Claims may only be subordinated equitably, and
there is nothing inherently inequitable about a tax claim or a secured claim.90 The inequity will
usually be by the holder of the claim. At least as envisioned by the legislative leader, it would be
only the rare type of claim that would be categorically inequitable, and the Supreme Court has since
said that subordination may not occur solely because of the categorical nature of a claim, such as a
tax penalty claim.91

Thus, equity provides the limits of subordination.

While the law of

subordination may develop, this development must exist within the confines of the “principles of
equitable subordination.”
The text and legislative history of § 510(c) tell us that subordination must be done under the
principles of equitable subordination. These principles can develop, but they are bounded by the fact
that subordination must be equitable. In § 510(c), equitable means not only fair, but fair within the
sense of what a court of equity would do.
2. Nemo Dat Did Not Apply in Equity Historically
There are two sources for the principles of equity: case law and equity maxims. Both
counsel against the application of nemo dat to priority resulting from equitable subordination. For
89
90
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there to be a question of priority, there have to be multiple parties competing for control over a
limited fund. Such suits were never resolved in law courts, but in chancery.92 The core areas of
equity jurisdiction are all areas involving division of a limited asset: bankruptcy estates, estates of
deceased persons, trusts, land rights.93 Nemo dat is a common law doctrine; historically it did not
apply in equity.94 This means that nemo dat has never historically been applied to issues of priority.
3. Equity Acts In Personam
Equity maxims—glowing phrases that summarize the principles of chancery decisions—are
another source for the principles of equity.95 Equity maxims have been more or less canonized,
albeit with some slight variation. While we should not make too much out of these old and opaque
phrases,96 these maxims are important not only because § 510(c) itself tells us to look to the
“principles of equitable subordination,” but because they encapsulate centuries of judicial wisdom.
Although their interpretation is an open matter, they are important guideposts for our present
jurisprudence and adherence to them ensures that equitable subordination remains equitable, and
does not become a bunion on the Chancellor’s foot, a problem noted by the 17th century
commentator John Selden:
Equity is A Roguish thing, for Law wee have a measure known what to trust too.
Equity is according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or
narrower, soe is equity. Tis all one as if they should make the Standard for the
measure wee call A foot, to be the Chancellors Foot; what an uncertain measure
would this be; One Chancellor ha’s a long foot another A short foot a third an
indifferent foot; this the same thing in the Chancellors Conscience.97

91

Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, 518 U.S. at 229.
See Harman v. Masoneilan Int’l, Inc., 442 A.2d 487, 498 (Del. 1982) (citing 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 1300 at 647 (14th Ed. 1918)); Bovay v. H. M. Byllesby & Co., 38 A.2d 808,813 (Del. 1944) (“The
execution of a trust and the following and administering of trust funds are immemorial heads of equity jurisprudence.”);
Hayden v. Thompson, 71 F. 60, 62 (8th Cir. 1895).
93
See P.V. BAKER & P. ST. J. LANGAN, SNELL'S EQUITY 1 (29th ed. 1990).
94
Holt v. The Am. Woolen Co., 150 A. 382, 383 (Me. 1930); Emerson v. European & N. Am. R. Co., 67 Me. 387 (Me.
1877); Mitchell v. Winslow, 17 F. Cas. 527, 531 (C.C.D. Me. 1843) (No. 9,673) (Story J.).
95
Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort Law, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 269, 273-75
(1991).
96
See Jeremiah Smith, The Use of Maxims in Jurisprudence, 9 HARV. L. REV. 13 (1896).
97
See JOHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK 43 (Pollock ed., 1927) (spelling, capitalization, and punctuation original).
92

© 2006, Adam J. Levitin

29
Without the benefit of maxims and precedent, it is hard to know what principle would guide equity,
and therefore equitable subordination, if not a judge’s own personal priority scheme.
One commentator has noted that “it would not be difficult to reduce [all of the equity maxims
to two:] ‘Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy’, and ‘Equity acts on the person.’”98
These two maxims, particularly the later one, often given as “equity acts in personam,”99 highlight a
fundamental problem with Enron, because Enron decided the first issue—whether Fleet could be
subordinated for actions unrelated to the claim—on an in personam basis, but decided the second
issue—whether the Funds could be subordinated for holding a claim that could have been
subordinated in Fleet’s hands—using an in rem logic.
Generally, the in personam maxim has been understood to address jurisdictional questions.100
The maxim itself bears no indication that it is so restricted, and, historically, equity has exercised in
rem jurisdiction.101

All of trust law, where the trust is the res, bears testament to this, and

bankruptcy is itself essentially an in rem proceeding102 dealing with the res of the bankruptcy estate,
itself a trust. A reconsideration of the in personam maxim is necessary, therefore.
A sensible approach is to take the maxim literally and not imply a jurisdictional aspect. In
Ernst v. The White Motor Credit Corp.,103 the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio
did just this. The court refused to grant equitable perfection to a security interest misfiled in good
faith in the wrong county (and thus unperfected) because perfection would affect third parties,
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including the trustee in bankruptcy, who was the debtor’s successor in interest.104 The court noted
that, “It would be absolutely incongruous to apply equitable principles to defeat the rights of third
parties who were in no way involved in the questioned transaction. Equity acts in personam, not in
rem.”105
The in personam maxim can reasonably be understood to mean that equity looks at the
person, not at the claim. Such an interpretation is consistent with other equity maxims. Perhaps the
best-known equity maxim is that “One who comes into equity must come with clean hands.”106 This
maxim means equitable relief will not be granted to parties who have engaged in misconduct.107 The
clean hands maxim reminds us that equity looks at the entire picture, not just the specific claim. The
inequitable behavior that creates unclean hands need not be the act before the court. Equity acts in
personam by looking at the entirety of the personae before the court.108
This tells us that the first issue in Enron—whether the loan participation claims could be
subordinated in Fleet’s hands for Fleet’s unrelated wrongdoing—was consistent with the principles
of equity, even if it was based on questionable authority.109 If Fleet engaged in inequitable behavior
toward Enron, then any claims in Fleet’s hands should be subject to equitable subordination,
regardless of whether Fleet was the original holder of the claims or a transferee.110
There is also a negative implication to the clean hands maxim: equity will not punish those

104

UCC § 9-203(2) (2001). Under Article 9, perfection or lack thereof relates only to the priority of a claim over other
secured creditors’ interests in the collateral, not to the creditor’s rights vis-à-vis the debtor.
105
Ernst, 28 B.R. 289. Several courts have adopted similar stances in cases dealing with equitable subrogation.
Subrogation is a legal fiction of an assignment or transfer that allows one party to stand in the shoes of another party in
reference to a claim. Subrogation is intended to provide meritorious creditors who have paid the debt of another relief
against loss. Rinn v. First Union Nat’l Bank of Md., 176 B.R. 401, 407 (D.Md. 1995). It is a doctrine that originates in
equity and is governed by equitable principles. Compania Anonima Venezolana de Navegacion v. A.J. Perez Export
Co., 303 F.2d 692, 697 (5th Cir. 1962).
106
BAKER & LANGAN, supra note 93, at 27.
107
Jones v. Bodley, 39 A.2d 413, 416 (Del. Ch. 1944).
108
Comstock, 335 U.S. at 238 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“Equity looks in all directions.”).
109
Levitin, supra note 41, at 393.
110
Nonetheless, it should be noted that the first half of Enron stands on shaky precedent. Judge Gonzalez repeatedly
emphasized that there was no precedent barring him from subordinating Fleet, 333 B.R. at 219, 219 n.4, 220, 222, but
this hardly means that the contrapositive is true and that subordination would be proper.
© 2006, Adam J. Levitin

31
who have clean hands. This implication can be tied to a third equity maxim, “Equity is equality.”111
Bankruptcy incorporates this maxim in its distribution scheme by treating all claims within a class
alike in regard to distribution.112 Subordination is an exception to equal treatment of claims that
should otherwise be in the same class. In this sense, a party that seeks to avoid subordination must
have clean hands if it wants the equitable treatment of equality with like claims.
Similarly, the maxim that “he who seeks equity must do equity,”113 emphasizes that equity
may not be used for inequitable ends. Just as equity will not aid the wicked, it will not punish the
innocent.114 Nemo dat sometimes results in punishing the innocent. If a creditor obtained a debt by
fraud and then sold the debt to a good faith purchaser, denying the purchaser the ability to enforce
the debt penalizes the purchaser, even if he can still hope to recover from his seller. A fortiori, then
that applying nemo dat to issues of priority in an equitable subordination context, where the
subordination was on account of behavior unrelated to the claim, involves punishing innocent claims
purchasers. The Enron equitable subordination was contrary to the principles of equity. Nemo dat
should not apply to situations in which priority is set equitably after creditors have extended value.
4. The Principles of Equity Imply a Good Faith Purchaser Defense
The principles of equity not only argue against applying nemo dat to the transferability of
equitable priority determined after the transfer; they also argue for allowing the good faith purchaser
defense. A good faith purchaser defense is an exception to nemo dat because the good faith
purchaser is protected from defenses that could be raised against the original creditor. The Funds
111
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attempted to make a good faith purchaser defense on the basis of § 550(b) of the Code, which
provides that the trustee or DIP may not avoid certain liens or recover a preference, setoff, postpetition transaction, or fraudulent transfer against a good faith taker for value either from an
immediate transferee or from the taker’s subsequent good faith transferees.115
The Bankruptcy Court rejected this argument under the principle expressio unius est exclusio
alterius because § 550(b) only creates a good faith exception to transfers that could be avoided under
§§ 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, 553(b), and 724(a), not to claims subordinatable under § 510(c).116 The
Bankruptcy Court noted that the types of transactions protected under § 550(b) were transactions
between a good faith purchaser and the bankruptcy estate.117 Section 550(b) protects the ownership
rights of purchasers from the estate. Section 510(c), in contrast, deals only with priority, not
ownership rights, and the Funds were looking for protection as good faith purchasers from a prior
claimant on the estate, rather than from the estate itself. The Bankruptcy Court correctly divined that
§ 550(b)’s good faith purchaser protections are meant to encourage parties to deal with the
bankruptcy estate; it is not meant to encourage (or one might add discourage) claims trading.
Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court held that there was no reason to imply a good faith purchaser
defense to § 510(c) actions on the basis of § 550(b)’s provisions.118
There are a couple of alternative explanations, not considered by the Bankruptcy Court, for
why § 550(b) does not provide a statutory good faith purchaser defense to equitable subordination
that do not preclude a non-statutory basis for such a defense. First, when Congress drafted the
Bankruptcy Code, it did not conceive of a situation in which a good faith purchaser of a bankruptcy
claim could be subordinated under the principles of equitable subordination. There was no need for
an explicit statutory grant of a good faith defense, because there was no anticipated harm. Equitable
can only hold a person accountable for his own actions, absent special duties.
115
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116
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subordination was never conceived of as affecting parties down a chain of title, only the party that
acted inequitably itself. Accordingly, § 510 was not grouped in the Code with the provisions that
affect transferred claims and obligations in subchapter III of Chapter 5.
More importantly, a good faith defense is implied within § 510(c) by the phrase “principles
of equitable subordination.” Good faith is an equitable defense119 that one would expect to be
encompassed within the principles of equitable subordination. Congress did not want to assume the
daunting task of codifying equity jurisprudence—it was far easier to direct the courts to do what they
have traditionally done. This means protecting good faith purchasers in equitable actions. The
absence of a statutory good faith purchaser defense against equitable subordination in § 550(b) does
not preclude an implied equitable defense in § 510(c).120
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B. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE ADOPTS NEMO DAT FOR PRIORITY IN A LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCE
In considering whether nemo dat applies to bankruptcy claims’ priority, a factor that must be
considered is the Bankruptcy Code’s treatment of priority of subrogated claims. Unfortunately, it is
hard to draw generalizations from this limited context. Section 507(a) of the Code elevates the
priority of nine types of unsecured claims.121 Section 507(d), however, provides that the subrogor of
a holder of any of seven of the nine types of § 507(a) claims is not subrogated to the elevated priority
of the claim.122 Instead, the subrogor has the status of a general unsecured creditor, even though the
subrogee had higher priority:
An entity that is subrogated to the rights of a holder of a claim of a kind specified in
subsection (a)(3) [wage claims], (a)(4) [employee benefit claims], (a)(5) [farmers’ and
fishermen’s claims], (a)(6), [personal down payment claims] (a)(7) [alimony and
child support claims], (a)(8) [tax claims], or (a)(9) [federal depository insurer claims]
of this section is not subrogated to the right of the holder of such claim to priority
under such subsection.123
The two types of claims for which a subrogee is subrogated to 507(a) priority are (1) those claims for
the administrative expenses of the bankruptcy estate under § 503,124 which are prioritized under
§507(a)(1),125 and (2) claims for unsecured claims filed under § 502(f) for debts incurred in
involuntary bankruptcies between the filing of the involuntary petition and the order for relief,126
which are prioritized under § 507(a)(2).127
While there might be cause to distinguish between a good faith purchaser and a subrogor,
who does not necessarily take for value, § 507(d) appears to be an exception to a general rule
regarding transfers of priority of bankruptcy claims. The scope of this general rule is not clear: does
§ 507(d) imply subrogation to priority in all other situations or just for § 507(a)(1) and (a)(2) claims?
The better reading is the later one.

Section 507(d) only announces a divergence in
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subrogation to specifically prioritized claims, not from a general principle that a claims’ priority is
indelible. This narrow reading is probably preferred, and not just on the principle that the specific
controls over the general. Section 507(a)(1) and (a)(2) claims are prioritized for different policy
reasons from the other types of § 507(a) claims, and § 507(d) apparently distinguishes on this basis.
Section 507(a)(1) gives special priority to §503 administrative expense claims. Administrative
expenses of a bankruptcy estate are given priority status as an incentive to taking the risk of
extending value to an insolvent entity.
Likewise, § 507(a)(2) gives special priority to § 502(f) claims for debts incurred between the
filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition and the order for relief. Section 502(f) claims are similar
to administrative expenses, as they too are debts incurred by the bankruptcy estate post-petition.
Section 502(f) claims involve value that is extended to the estate, not the debtor.

Allowing

subrogors of administrative creditors to receive the administrative creditors’ priority ensures the
resale value of administrative claims. This keeps administrative claims liquid and makes them more
valuable, which encourages creditors to extend post-petition value to debtors.
The other types of § 507(a) claims, like those for wages, alimony, child support, and taxes,
are claims of creditors that extended value before bankruptcy. These types of claims are not likely to
be resold—they are either held by unsophisticated parties that lack access to the claims trading
market or by the government. These claims receive elevated priority because of Congress’ social
policy judgment that they are more worthy than other unsecured creditors who extended value prepetition. The factor giving priority for these claims is also intimately connected with the identity of
the initial claim holder. Congress wanted to treat spouses and children of bankrupts different from
other parties. The same for employees, farmers, fisherman, and the government. The reason they
receive the priority inheres in them and cannot be transferred; it is an in personam characteristic.
126
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It is hard to know what to glean from § 507(d), but it is a stretch to read it as implying a
general indorsement of nemo dat in regard to priority in bankruptcy. Indeed, § 507(d) involves its
inverse of nemo dat. Rather than conveying more than one has, § 507(d) means that § 507(a) parties,
other than those with § 503 and § 502(f) claims, convey less than they have. Section 507(d) simply
does not address whether a subrogor gets a subrogee’s priority for claims that do not have § 507(a)
priority, much less whether this applies to situations beyond subrogation, such as good faith
purchasers for value. The better reading of § 507(d) is that it does not speak to nemo dat as a general
matter in terms of priority of bankruptcy claims, only to a limited question of statutory priority.
C. NEMO DAT APPLIES ONLY IF THERE IS JUSTIFIED RELIANCE ON PRIORITY
Because nemo dat is the default rule of property transfers, debtors are justified in relying
upon it.128 If I take out a loan from the bank, I expect that any defense I have against the bank’s
enforcement of the debt will also be available to me against anyone the bank sells the loan to. Nemo
dat protects borrowers’ justified expectations. When the law opts out of a nemo dat regime, it is
only with clear notice, so borrowers do not rely on the ability to raise the same defenses against their
lenders’ transferees as they do against their lender. The notice provided by negotiability systems is
designed to alert borrowers to demand a price reduction in order to part with their rights.
Whether nemo dat should apply to questions of priority in bankruptcy depends on whether
there was justified reliance by creditors. As a general matter, nemo dat is the principle adopted by
the law because it is an important protection for obligors against malfeasance by assignors. Suppose
A sells B a debt A claims that he is owed by C. If C does not actually owe A the debt, we would not
want C to be liable to B for it, much less let A walk away with his profit from the resale.
Accordingly, nemo dat is the baseline rule of law, so C can raise any defense against B that he can
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against A. Thus, C does not end up paying a debt that he does not owe. Nor is B left with the loss.
B has various contract and tort claims against A, so A does not end up profiting unjustly. Nemo dat
means caveat emptor for transferees like B, but a transferee of a debt is usually not a consumer, but a
sophisticated party that is capable of protecting itself.
Where the law varies from the nemo dat paradigm, it is only with clear notice that changes
what constitutes justified reliance. As a general matter, the law strives to protect parties’ justified
expectations. This principle is what animates the application of nemo dat or negotiability in nonbankruptcy contexts.
For example, UCC Article 3 requires that instruments comply with various formal
requirements to be negotiable.129 The formal indicia inform a potential holder in due course130 that
he may enforce his instrument subject only to the “real” defenses of infancy, incapacity, illegality,
duress, fraud in the factum, discharge in insolvency, other known discharge, suretyship defenses,
statute of limitations, material alteration of the instrument, and forgery. “Real” defenses go to the
validity of the instrument itself, as opposed to the creation transaction, and to whether the obligor
knew or had the capacity to know it was creating a negotiable instrument, and thus surrendering
certain defenses. The holder in due course is not subject to the so-called “personal” defenses,
namely simple contract defenses, like breach of contract, breach of warranty, fraud in the
inducement, lack of consideration, failure of consideration, theft, failure of a condition precedent,
mistake, unconscionability, impossibility, and waiver.131 Thus, a debtor who issues a negotiable
instrument is not justified in relying on having personal defenses against a holder in due course.
Conversely, a party that purchases a negotiable instrument in good faith is justified in relying on
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UCC § 3-104 (1991).
The Holder in Due Course is one who obtains an instrument for value and without notice UCC § 3-302(1991). The
Holder in Due Course is just the good faith purchaser in a UCC Article 3 guise, and good faith in the UCC is nothing
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(2004).
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protections as a holder in due course.
The justified reliance principle also determines whether nemo dat will apply in areas of law
involving priority, such as real estate deeds and security interests (including mortgages).

Real

estate and security interest both have notice-filing systems. When a real estate deed or security
interest is properly filed or perfected, the law imputes constructive notice of its priority to other
parties. When the deed or security interest is not properly filed or perfected, no notice is imputed.
The priority of a recorded deed is generally determined by a first in time, first in right rule, so a
prospective buyer should search the title filing system to determine if someone other than the seller
has recorded the deed. Nemo dat protects the reliance of buyers who search the title system.
Thus, if A sells Blackacre to B, who does not record the deed, and A subsequently sells
Blackacre to C, a good faith purchaser who records the deed, C has title to Blackacre, not B. B is left
only with tort and contract claims against A. A search of the recording system tells C that it is safe
for him to rely on A having good title.132 Because B did not properly record the deed, no notice is
implied to C, so nemo dat does not apply, and A could transfer more to C than he actually had. If, on
the other hand, B had recorded the deed before C, nemo dat would apply in a priority context. A
would have nothing to convey to C, and B would have priority over C.
A similar situation occurs security interests. A security interest only gives its holder priority
over other creditors when it is perfected.133 For a security interest to be perfected is has to be
properly filed in the UCC recordation system134 or in the physical control of the secured party.135 As
with real estate, the priority of a perfected security interest is determined by automatic operation of
law, generally under a first in time to perfect, first in right rule.136 This means that other would-be
creditors can rely on a search through the UCC filing system to determine what their priority would
132

C will also be protected by warranties of title and the like.
UCC §§ 9-201(a), 9-317 (2001).
134
UCC § 9-308 (2001). Certain types of security interests perfect upon attachment. UCC § 9-309 (2001).
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UCC § 9-314 (2001).
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be and make lending decisions based upon this research. Moreover, perfected security interests
retain their priority when the collateral is transferred to a another party.137 Therefore, lenders are on
constructive notice of perfected security interests.
A party’s reliance on its priority as a result of a search of the UCC system is only justified if
the priority of the security interests is static. If a creditor could sell its security interest and the
purchaser could receive higher priority than the original creditor, then parties would not be secure in
their security’s priority. Similarly, if an purchaser of a security interest could receive lower priority
than the seller, the liquidity of secured debts would be limited. Accordingly, nemo dat is the
principle that applies to the priority of perfected security interests.
This contrasts with the priority of unperfected security interests. If A had an unperfected
security interest in B’s widgets, A could assign its security interest to C, who could then perfect it by
making the proper filing. C would thus end up with better than A gave. If creditor D had lent to B
before A and also had an unperfected security interest in the widgets, D would have stood equal with
A in a bankruptcy, but D would stand behind C once C had perfected. In both real estate title and
security interests, nemo dat governs transfers of priority only if there is an appropriate filing in a
constructive notice-filing system upon which other purchasers or creditors can rely. Nemo dat does
not apply when there is no justified reliance because either the form of the debt provides the debtor
with notice that he is surrendering rights or there is not a proper filing in a notice-filing system.
The justified reliance principle also guides the application of nemo dat in bankruptcy law.
While no court before Enron had ruled on the whether nemo dat applied to equitably determined
priority, the Supreme Court has held that nemo dat applies to statutorily determined priority (with the
obvious exclusion of § 507(d)). In Shropshire, Woodlife, & Co. v. Bush, the Court held that an
assigned wage claim retained its § 507(a)(3) priority after assignment because the “character of the
136
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debts was fixed when they were incurred, and could not be changed by an assignment.”138
The priority of a claim is for wages is fixed by statute when it accrues. Other creditors have
notice of what the wage claim’s priority is and lend on this knowledge. Similarly, a purchaser of the
wage claim can rely on the claim’s priority in determining its expected value. All creditors are on
notice of statutory priority before they lend, just as they are of the priority of a recorded deed or
perfected security interest. Accordingly, their reliance on the priority is justified and nemo dat is an
appropriate legal standard because it protects the creditors’ justified reliance.
In contrast, a claim’s equitable priority is not fixed when the debt is incurred. Indeed,
whether to equitably subordinate a claim is reserved for the court’s discretion, as is the amount of the
subordination.139 And, under Enron, because a claim may be equitably subordinated for its holder’s
unrelated behavior, the inequitable behavior that would alter the claim’s priority could occur after
the debt is incurred. Equitable priority is not a fixed characteristic of a claim. Accordingly, creditors
never lend in reliance of priority resulting from a future equitable subordination. While a claims
purchaser might theoretically purchase claims that have already been subordinated, once claims’
equitable priority has been determined, there is notice and nemo dat should apply. The point is
manifest: claims purchasers should not bear reduced priority because the claims could have been
subordinated in the hands of a previous holder. As long as the claims were not actually subordinated
137

UCC § 9-325 (2001).
204 U.S. 186, 189 (1907). See also Wilson v. Brooks Supermarket, Inc. (In re Missionary Baptist Found., Inc.), 667
F.2d 1244, 1247 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding wage claims retained priority in hands of assignee check indorsee); Carnegia v.
Ga. Higher Educ. Assistance Corp., 691 F.2d 482, 483 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that a non-dischargable student loan
remains non-dischargeable in hands of assignee); In re Zipco, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 675, 677 (S.D. Cal. 1957) (holding
wage claims retained priority in hands of assignee stockholder), aff'd sub nom. Bass v. Shutan, 259 F.2d 561, 563 (9th
Cir. 1958); Dorr Pump & Mfg. Co. v. Heath (In re Dorr Pump & Mfg. Co.), 125 F.2d 610, 611 (7th Cir. 1942) (holding
wage claims retained priority in hands of assignee director and shareholder). But see SEC v. Albert & Maguire Sec. Co.,
560 F.2d 569, 570 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding that a bank assignee of a customer’s claim in a Securities Investor Protection
Act liquidation is not subrogated to the customer’s priority if the equities are contradindicative). Courts have also held
that assignees retain assignors’ rights, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Tele Resources, Inc., 724 F.2d 266, 269 (2d Cir. 1983)
(holding that assignee succeeds to assignors’ defenses); In re Elliott, 385 F. Supp. 1194, 1196 (M.D. La. 1974) (finding
that assignee acquires all transferor's rights of action).
139
E.g., Gregory v. Finova Captial Corp, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 6117, *16 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006); Bayer Corp. v. Mascotech,
Inc. (In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc.), 269 F.3d 726, 744 (6th Cir. 2001) (equitable subordination is not mandatory, even if
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in the previous holder’s hands, their equitable priority was not fixed, so it should not transfer with
the claims, especially when the previous holder’s inequitable behavior was unrelated to the claims in
question.
The justified reliance principle shows that Enron erred in applying nemo dat to the priority of
the Fleet loan participation claims.

Even if the loan participation claims could have been

subordinated in Fleet’s hands, they should not have been subordinated in the Funds’. None of
Enron’s creditors relied on the Seller Banks’ subordination when lending. In Enron, the loan
participations were first lien secured.140 Other creditors, therefore, were on constructive notice on
the debt’s existence in terms of their bankruptcy priority and had to assume that they were of lower
priority.

Any reliance on the loans’ existence was in terms of Enron’s leverage and thus its

bankruptcy risk and potential unsecured assets in bankruptcy, not the other creditors’ priority in
bankruptcy. Any harm incurred by other creditors was not from the existence of Fleet’s claim141 or
its priority, but from its alleged inequitable action. The proper remedy for this situation is a tort
action against the inequitable party.142
Direct tort actions by the injured creditors present the best remedy for inequitable behavior
by a former creditor that has sold its claims because it results in proper cost internalization. Because
not all creditors were necessarily injured by the inequitable behavior, only the ones who were injured
should benefit from a suit. If a direct suit is brought by the bankruptcy estate or a subordination
action is undertaken, other, uninjured creditors might reap a windfall. Moreover, direct suits by
injured creditors force the inequitable party to internalize the costs of its behavior, rather than
imposing the costs on innocent claims purchasers who must sue up the chain of title to make good
their loss.
all elements of Mobile Steel test are met); Aetna Bank v. Dvorak (In re McDonald Creek Dev. Co.), 176 B.R. 160, 166
(N.D. Ill. 1994); Allied Tech., Inc. v. R.B. Brunemann & Sons, Inc., 25 B.R. 484, 499 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
140
Enron, 333 B.R. at 212.
141
If the claim were the product of sufficiently bad behavior, it should be disallowed.
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D. THE LIMITATIONS OF LEAST-COST AVOIDER ANALYSIS
The justified reliance principle often coincides with the economic goal of identifying the
least-cost avoider of the problem and placing the risk-burden on that least-cost avoider. Thus, the
least-cost avoider of a misunderstanding in a deed or security interest notice-filing system is the
party that received its property right first, but failed to record it. Accordingly, that party bears the
risk of a subsequent purchaser or interest holder recording first and obtaining title or priority.
Similarly, the maker of a note is in the best position to control whether the note is negotiable or not,
so the maker bears the risk of having limited defenses against transferees of the note if she does not
ensure that the note is non-negotiable.
But there are cases in which there either is no least-cost avoider or the least-cost avoider is
indeterminate, and in these cases, legal, rather than economic principles dictate allocation of risk.
This is the case with equitable subordination of bankruptcy claims. Only the claims’ purchaser is in
a position to investigate whether the claims are tainted, but it is not clear whether this can be
successfully done on a cost-efficient basis. Even if it can, the failure of the purchaser to take care
results not only in a loss to the purchaser, but also in a windfall to other creditors, who did not rely
on the equitably subordinated priority of the claims when they lent. Equitable subordination may
aim to punish, but the subordination of a transferee punishes an innocent party, not the wrongdoer,
and creates a windfall for other creditors.
Equitable subordination of bankruptcy claims in the hands of good faith transferees pits two
fundamentally innocent parties against each other:

the transferee and the other creditors.

As

between innocents, bankruptcy law divides risk in other cases. Thus, the risk of a preferential
payment being voided is on the payee, but only for 90 days (one year in the case of insiders).143
Thereafter, the risk of assets leaving the estate in a preferential payment switches to the other
142
143

Levitin, supra note 41, at 404-411.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2006).
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creditors. While this sort of risk sharing works for preferences, it is not practical for equitable
subordination. A relatively straightforward forensic accounting can determine whether a payment
was a preference or not, so it is reasonable to force the innocent creditors to be vigilant for 90 days.
But inequitable behavior is much harder to define and discern. Often, equitable subordination
actions are brought well into the course of Chapter 11 bankruptcies as investigations proceed. The
temporal division of risk that the Code employs for preferences is not practical for equitable
subordination because of the prolonged uncertainty it would produce. A bright-line rule that protects
transferees would eliminate such costly uncertainty. The principle that ultimately guides such a rule
is that of justified reliance, not the least-cost avoider.
E. WHAT CONSTITUTES JUSTIFIED RELIANCE ON PRIORITY?
While the justified reliance principle is the guide for determining whether nemo dat applies to
a property transfer, the question remains as to what constitutes justified reliance. Put another way,
when is a party on notice of equitable priority?
The Restatement (Second) on Contracts and UCC Article 9 both answer this question in
terms of when the equities accrue. A transferee is only subject to the equities that accrue before the
obligor receives notice of the transfer.144 The Restatement and the UCC do not explain when
equities accrue. The Supreme Court’s 1906 ruling in Fidelity Mutual Insurance Co. v. Clark,145 one
of the principal cases relied upon by Enron as support for the application of nemo dat,146 illustrates
when equities accrue.
In Clark, a Texan named Hunter and his widowed sister, Mettler, contrived to defraud

144

Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts § 336(2) (1981); UCC § 9-318(1) (2001). Compare Restatement (First)
of the Law of Contracts, § 167(1) (1962) (“An assignee’s right against the obligor is subject to all limitations of the
obligee’s right . . . provided that such defenses . . . are based on facts existing at the time of the assignment, or are based
on facts arising thereafter prior to knowledge of the assignment by the obligor.”).
145
203 U.S. 64, 74 (1906) (Holmes, J.).
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Enron, 333 B.R. at 223.
© 2006, Adam J. Levitin

44
Fidelity.147 Hunter took out three life insurance policies on himself from Fidelity, and named
Mettler, as beneficiary.148 Hunter was then falsely reported as dead, although the body was never
found,149 and Mettler engaged an attorney, Clark, to collect the insurance proceeds. Clark, unaware
of the scheme, took an assignment of a one-third interest in the policies as his fee.150 Clark then
further assigned and mortgaged his interest151 before winning a collection judgment for Mettler
against Fidelity.152
After paying out the policies, Fidelity learned that reports of Hunter’s death had been greatly
exaggerated. Fidelity then sued to recover the payments under the policies from Mettler and the
various assignees.153 Clark and his subsequent assignees argued that he was a good faith purchaser
of the one-third interest in the policy and that he was therefore entitled to keep the proceeds.
Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, noted that Clark had properly acquired legal title to the
proceeds, and, to recover the proceeds, Fidelity “must show some equity before [Clark’s] legal title
can be disturbed,”154 which meant showing that Clark took the assignment either with notice or
without having given value.155 Because Clark clearly gave value in the form of his services, Fidelity
argued that he took with notice of the equities in the case. The Court disagreed, noting that
the equities to which an assignee takes subject are equities existing at the time of the
assignment and . . . the notice with which he is supposed to be charged as an assignee
can be of nothing more . . .. The policies were honest contracts[,] and it was an
interest in the policies which was assigned . . ..156
This is the same rule as the Restatement and the UCC Article 9. Unlike the Restatement or UCC,
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Clark, 203 U.S. at 72.
Fidelity Mut. Life Assoc. v. Mettler, 185 U.S. 308 (1902).
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Clark shows how the rule applies. The Supreme Court emphasized that “notice of the denial that
Hunter was dead, in the suit on the policy” was not notice of the fraud because Clark believed
Mettler’s case.157 Indeed, the Court noted that even if Fidelity had responded in the original
collection suit with an affirmative defense alleging fraud, it would not have constituted sufficient
notice to Clark to vitiate his good faith purchaser defense.158
Clark refines nemo dat to mean that an assignee stands in no better position than the rights of
the assignor as they exist at the time of the assignment.159 The fact that an assignor is later found to
have engaged in behavior that would have impugned the rights transferred had they been in the
assignor’s hands does not apply against the assignee, if the assignee took for value and without
notice.160 An assignee does not take subject to contingent equities. Equities accrue when they are
proven, rather than when they are theoretical or alleged.
This means that Fleet’s negative equities did not accrue in Enron until the court had
determined that Fleet could be subordinated, so they did not attach to the loan participation claims.
In Enron, the Funds purchased the claim before there was any allegation, much less proof, of
inequitable behavior by Fleet. Thus, the equities did not accrue with the filing of the Megacomplaint
nor at the time of Fleet’s behavior, unless the Funds were aware of Fleet’s actions and believed them
to taint its claims. Under Clark, the Funds should not be subject to the contingent equities of the
claim, only to those actually shown. A fortiori, they should not be subject to Fleet’s equities
unrelated to the claim.
F. CAN A BANKRUPTCY CLAIM EVER BE PURCHASED IN GOOD FAITH?
Enron might still be differentiated from Clark because it held that the Funds could not be
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good faith purchasers because they had purchased bankruptcy claims. Even if there were a good faith
purchaser defense to § 510(c), the Funds could not avail themselves of it because by purchasing
bankruptcy claims, they had notice of the possibility of subordination. “The purchase of a claim
itself[] evidences the transferee’s willingness to assume the risks attendant to a bankruptcy
proceeding,”161 so a transferee of bankruptcy claims “is on notice that any defense or right of the
debtor, including equitable subordination, may be asserted against that claim.”162
The Bankruptcy Code does not contain a definition of “good faith.” Instead, courts have
determined it on a case-by-case basis, searching for the indicia of an arms-length transaction.163
There was no evidence of the Fund’s active, knowing collusion in an attempt to launder Fleet’s
claims.164 Instead, Enron held that the very nature of bankruptcy claims trading precluded good faith
purchases because buyers were always on notice of the possibility of subordination.165
Rather than showing why the Funds should not be good faith purchasers, Clark shows that
they were. The Funds purchased their claims before the Megacomplaint. This puts them in as good
a position as Clark, who received his assignment before there was any allegation of inequitable
behavior.
Nor does the possibility of subordination does not distinguish Enron from Clark, because
there was also the possibility of a fraud action in Clark. Although only bankruptcy claims are
subject to § 510(c) actions, all legal claims for money—choses in action—are subject to a variety of
defenses and may turn out to be worthless. Accordingly, the class action plaintiffs’ bar regularly
syndicates interests in lawsuits, as if they were loan participations, in order to diversify their
litigation portfolios precisely because of the risk that any particular suit will be dismissed and have
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no value. Given the discretionary nature of equitable subordination,166 the Funds were arguably on
even less notice than Clark about the impairment to chose in action they purchased. A legal risk,
even when litigation has commenced, does not constitute notice under Clark.
Moreover, there was not a known legal risk of subordination before the Enron decision.167
The Bankruptcy Court was unable to cite a case in which the inequitable behavior of a party
unrelated to a bankruptcy claim was grounds for subordination of the claim in the hands of a
secondary or tertiary transferee. Enron broke new legal ground, and in order to do so it required a
presumption that the legal ground had already been broken. The Funds should not have been
excluded from good faith purchaser status solely because they purchased bankruptcy claims. They
took the claims for value and without notice that the claims were subordinatable.
Enron appears to have adopted an irrebutable presumption168 that bankruptcy claims cannot
be traded in good faith in order to prevent “claims washing,” the selling at full market value of a
subordinatable claim by an inequitable actor to a party in whose hands the claim could not be
subordinated. The development of the claims market has greatly affected the dynamics of corporate
reorganizations, and is viewed with askance by many practitioners and judges whose formative
professional experiences pre-date mass claims trading.169 Whatever one thinks about the influence
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See, e.g., Bayer Corp., 269 F.3d at 744 (equitable subordination is not mandatory, even if all elements of Mobile Steel
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Enron’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions for Leave to Appeal form the Bankruptcy
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200[6]), at 8, cites Fortgang & Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, supra note 4,
at 14, as evidence that the risk of subordination of transferred claims was well known since 1990. Fortgang and Mayer,
however, cited only one case, Goldie v. Cox, 135 F.2d at 720, discussed supra page 22, which does not actually support
the proposition, and also included a “but see” citation to a more recent decision, Holt v. FDIC (In re CTS Truss, Inc.),
868 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1989). The paucity of supporting case law should give pause to treating
Fortgang and Mayers as making a definitive positive statement of law.
168
333 B.R. at 226.
169
For example, in the companion decision to Enron that denied the Funds’ motion to dismiss Enron’s action to disallow
the Funds’ claims under 11 U.S.C. § 502(d), Judge Gonzalez declared that “the claims trading market is not a
fundamental part of the bankruptcy process, its policies, historical roots, or purpose.” Enron Corp. v. Avenue Special
Situations Fund II, LP (In re Enron), 340 B.R. 180, 204 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). This statement is inaccurate. Claim
trading has deep historic roots in bankruptcies and equity receiverships. Fortgang & Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking
Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, supra note 4, at 9-13. It is true, however, that the Bankruptcy Code was not
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of claims trading on the reorganization process, it is not clear why there should be an irrebutable
presumption of bad faith for claims trades.
Setting aside hoary concerns about champerty, maintenance, and barratry,170 even in an oldfashioned equity context, there is no reason to presume lack of good faith when trading claims postpetition, as the same economic transaction could have occurred pre-petition. Should it really matter
that the Funds acquired the loan participation claims post-petition in the form of bankruptcy claims,
rather than as pre-petition distressed debt? In the later case, the Funds would have be purchasing, if
not a bankruptcy claim, then at least a high likelihood of holding a bankruptcy claim.
There are legitimate reasons for claims purchases, as Enron itself recognized.171 To tar all
claims purchases with the irrebutable presumption of bad faith is a significant policy decision that a
court should hesitate to do without serious consideration. A good guidepost for what constitutes
good faith in commercial transactions is the UCC. The UCC defines good faith as “honesty in fact
and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”172 By this definition, the
Funds were good faith purchasers of Fleet’s loan participation claims.

drafted with claims trading in mind, but the Bankruptcy Rules have allow for claims trading and have been revised to
make claims trading easier. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001 (2006).
Emphasizing the historic marginality of claims trading in the bankruptcy process misses the reality of today—
claims trading is an essential feature of the reorganization process, and limitations on it have real effects, not just on
individual reorganizations, but on the bankruptcy process in general and on capital markets as a whole. To declare that
claims trading is not a fundamental part of the bankruptcy process’ policies or purpose is to presume that one knows the
unstated policies of bankruptcy and knows the ultimate impact of claims trading. There is a lively debate within the
academic and practitioner community about both what the policy goals of bankruptcy are and should be, see Douglas G.
Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 574-580 (1998) (giving a taxonomy of the debate), and
about the effects of claims trading on reorganizations. See supra note 6. However a particular judge feels about who the
winners and losers are as a result of increased claims trading should not determine the outcome of legal questions.
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Elliot Assocs., L.P., v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding New York state champerty statute
does not apply to bankruptcy claims trading). Many courts no longer recognize causes of action for champerty,
maintenance, or barratry, holding that they have been replaced by actions for malicious prosecution and the like. E.g.,
Hardick v. Homol, 795 So. 2d 1107, 1112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); PSI Metals, Inc. v. Firemen's Ins. Co. of Newark
N.J., 839 F.2d 42, 43 (2nd Cir. 1998) (applying New York law); Tosi v. Jones, 685 N.E.2d 580, 583 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d
1996); McCullar v. Credit Bureau Sys., Inc., 832 S.W.2d 886, 887 (Ky. 1992); Sec. Underground Storage, Inc. v.
Anderson, 347 F.2d 964, 969 (10th Cir. 1965) (applying Kansas law); but see Weigel Broad. Co. v. Howard Topel, 1985
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23862, No. 83-C-7921 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (holding that, under Illinois law, a cause of action for
maintenance exists but explaining that it is so rare in modern times that the law on the subject is neither settled nor clear).
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Enron, 333 B.R. at 226.
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We should not lightly brush aside of the concerns of abusive claims trading. Rather than
adopt an irrebutable presumption of bad faith for all bankruptcy claims purchases without any reason
for distinguishing them from pre-petition distressed debt purchases, we should adopt a rebuttable
presumption of good faith. This presumption could have certain exceptions, such as claims trading
by fiduciaries of the debtor, claims trading to gain corporate control of the debtor, resale-sellbacks,
and claims trading in which the purchaser has neither conducted any diligence nor acquired a
warranty of equitable behavior. In such circumstances, the burden of showing good faith should rest
on the claims’ purchaser or the court should undertake a more exacting scrutiny of the transaction.
Moreover, in when a claims purchaser has acquired the claims as part of a transaction or connected
series of transactions that results in its acquisition of substantially all assets of former claims holder,
it should assume the same equities and priority of the former holder.173 Alternatively, bankruptcy
law could imply a warranty of equitable behavior in all claims trades, which would have to be
explicitly disavowed. Either way would be more sensible than declaring an entire market to be
tainted by bad faith.
Enron was a flawed decision from a doctrinal matter. It applied nemo dat to a situation in
which the rule’s protections are not needed. Nemo dat should be applied only to questions of priority
when there was (at least theoretically) justified reliance on priority set before a decision to lend.
Because equitable subordination always affects priority after creditors have lent, there can never be
justified reliance, so nemo dat should not apply to equitable subordination.
The doctrinal problems with Enron have real world consequences. As the next section
shows, Enron’s erroneous application of nemo dat has had serious negative consequences on
liquidity in the bankruptcy claims market. Because of the unique role of the bankruptcy claims
market as the residual capital market, these liquidity problems have been amplified into other capital
173
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markets, and generally increase borrowers’ bankruptcy risks. Enron applied nemo dat to priority
with the aim of protecting, but it actually hurt them by making debtors more likely to default and file
for bankruptcy.
V. NEMO DAT’S SYSTEMIC COSTS ON MARKET LIQUIDITY THROUGH ENRON174
A. THE UNIQUE ROLE OF THE BANKRUPTCY CLAIMS MARKET IN PROMOTING LIQUIDITY IN CAPITAL
MARKETS
Liquidity in the bankruptcy claims market is important to creditors for numerous legitimate
reasons. As Enron recognized, creditors sell their claims:
to avoid the administrative hassle and costs of bankruptcy proceedings; or to establish
a tax loss on their investment; or meet the regulatory requirements, including Basel
Accord capital requirement, auditing rules for balance sheet asset write-offs or markto-market accounting requirements for securities.175
Many creditors do not want to be claim holders throughout a bankruptcy because of the legal and
opportunity costs involved, and are happy to sell their claims at a discount.
The existence of a market in bankruptcy claims is important for the health of distressed debt
(and indirectly all debt and equity) markets. If there were no bankruptcy claims market, creditors
would be more reluctant to deal with distressed or high-risk companies because of the possibility that
they would be left holding bankruptcy claims of uncertain value and forced to incur the expense and
inconvenience of being claim holders. The bankruptcy claims market allows creditors to exit the
bankruptcy process before plan confirmation. This makes creditors more willing to extend credit in
the first place. The existence of the secondary market in bankruptcy claims thus increases the
liquidity of regular debt and equity markets and makes it easier for companies to raise capital.
Therefore, any legal rule that decreases the liquidity of the bankruptcy claims market affects nonbankruptcy markets and makes it harder for distressed companies to raise capital, which exacerbates
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financial distress and makes bankruptcies more likely.
Enron has decreased liquidity in the throughout capital markets by promulgating a legal rule
that creating a new type of counterparty risk. Counterparty risk is the risk entailed by dealing with a
particular transaction partner—in this case, the risk that the transaction partner is selling an impaired
asset. Post-Enron, claims purchasers must worry not just about sellers’ title, but also about sellers’
interactions with the debtor unrelated to the claim. This concern extends not just to the direct seller,
but also to all holders up the chain of title, as Enron involved the subordination not just of primary,
but also of secondary and tertiary transferees.176 Under Enron, the identity of a trading partner
matters, as does the identity of every previous holder of a claim. The identity and actions of all
parties up the chain of title continues to matter throughout the duration of a bankruptcy. The risk is
not divided between the parties through a statute of limitations; unlike for preferences177 and
fraudulent transfers,178 there is no statute of limitations on equitable subordination.
The doctrinal and policy analyses that supported Enron are questionable, but the most serious
problem with the decision is the uncertainty that it has injected into the distressed debt markets.
Adopting a nemo dat regime for bankruptcy claims’ priority, has effects that spill over into other
markets. Enron’s counterparty risk has raised the cost of transactions not just in the bankruptcy
claims market, but in several other credit markets. Increased transaction costs means that there will
be fewer transactions on the margins and thus the liquidity of the credit markets will contract.
Although Enron itself dealt with a relatively limited fact pattern, no one is sure what its limits are.
At the very least, it affects credit default swaps and loan participations. But its trajectory presents a
slippery slope that implicates all securities, debt, and derivative transactions.
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B. ENRON’S EFFECT ON OTHER MARKETS
1. The Bankruptcy Claims Trading Market
Bankruptcy claims traders are extremely sophisticated financial players who regularly engage
in risk valuation. Enron counterparty risk presents a unique problem for the market, though. There
is a qualitative difference to subordination risk, and claims traders do not know how to account for it.
Inequitable behavior is judged by a “soft,” in-the-eye-of-the-beholder standard. Whether a party
behaved inequitably is a judgment call, not a matter of black letter law. Thus, claims purchasers lack
reliable information for calculating the statistical probability of subordination of a particular claim.
They do not have sufficient information about any particular upstream claim holder’s actions, and
even if they did, they cannot calculate the magnitude of damages caused by the inequitable behavior.
And in electronic OTC markets, like bond trading, the trades are typically anonymous, so it is
impossible to learn about upstream holders.
Nor can claims purchasers evaluate the residual value of claims should they turn out to be
tainted. If a claim is subordinated, the purchaser can sue up the chain of title until the inequitable
party is brought into the litigation.

Ultimately, the value of such a suit depends on the

creditworthiness of the subordinated purchaser’s transferor. If the transferor is insolvent, the claims
purchaser will have a claim in the transferor’s bankruptcy—and a likely recovery of cents on the
dollar.

Claims purchasers do not typically have sufficient information on counterparties’

creditworthiness; the transaction is an asset purchase, not a loan, so detailed financial diligence is
neither offered nor expected. Even the most sophisticated financial actors do not know how to
account for Enron’s counterparty subordination risk.
It is hard to evaluate the trade-off between increased bankruptcy risk for all creditors and
increased counterparty risk for claims purchasers on the one hand versus increased protection from
inequitable creditors in bankruptcy on the other. Neither the increased bankruptcy risk nor the value
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of protection from claim washing can be quantified. The arbitrariness of this trade-off makes Enron
a questionable decision from a market perspective. It forces creditors to accept legally mandated
“insurance” against claim washing at the price of more debtors filing for bankruptcy.
Neither creditors nor debtors would likely opt into such an “insurance” system voluntarily.
Creditors have other methods of protecting themselves. Ex-ante options include secured debt,
sureties, and credit derivatives, while ex-post, they can undertake direct actions against the
inequitable parties.

Nor can creditors cannot easily anticipate which side of the equitable

subordination divide they might find themselves, but are not likely to assume that they have engaged
in wrongdoing. Finally, most creditors would prefer not to deal with a bankruptcy than have greater
protections in bankruptcy. The same is true of debtors. Neither debtors’ management nor ownership
would prefer greater protection for creditors in bankruptcy to a lower risk of bankruptcy because in a
bankruptcy the management and ownership are frequently replaced.
It is also probably impossible to conduct adequate diligence against Enron’s counterparty risk
in some situations, such as when the claims seller is a large financial institution that could have
interacted with the borrower in myriad ways over a lengthy period. A bank like Fleet, or any of the
mediary transferees in Enron, could have served as a underwriter of a debtor’s securities offerings, a
broker or market maker in the debtor’s securities, a trustee for the debtor’s pension plan, a
participant in a loan to the debtor, a direct lender to the debtor, or as the debtor’s adviser on a merger
or acquisition. Given the merger trend among financial institutions, a claim seller’s inequitable
behavior could have been committed by what was then a separate institution, making diligence
harder because of non-uniform records and limited institutional memory. Moreover, diligence is
extremely difficult for equitable subordination because equitable subordination does not require
illegal behavior. Frequently subordination is for legal, but untoward acts. It is not realistic to expect
the people who actually do the diligence—junior associates in document rooms—to have the
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judgment to discern what is equitable and what is not. It is a legal grey area.179
Enron will also have a marginal effect on who is involved in the reorganization drama. The
past decades have seen the rise of distressed debt investors—so-called “vulture” or “phoenix” funds,
like the Funds in Enron. Distressed debt investors have come to play an increasingly important role
in reorganizations, and there is considerable debate as to whether their presence furthers or hinders
the reorganization process.180 Enron will limit the involvement of distressed debt investors, although
one suspects that the impact will be marginal. The proper role for distressed debt investors is a
policy decision, not a legal one, and is better addressed by Congress than a court.
Enron will also affect the balance of power within reorganizations.

The increased

counterparty risk will increase the leverage of debtors and creditors committees when negotiating
with claims purchasers, further reducing the power of distressed debt investors in reorganizations.
Whether this is a positive result depends on one’s view of the influence of distressed debt investors
on reorganizations, but it represents a reversal of the increasing strength of distressed debt investors
in the reorganization process.
Enron might also impact venue choice.181 All things being equal, distressed debt investors
are more likely to purchase claims of a bankruptcy in a district that has not adopted Enron. This
means that more distressed debt investment will flow to jurisdictions like Delaware, if Enron is
upheld in the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit. Debtors that want to avoid
dealing with distressed investors would likely prefer filings in the Southern District of New York,
but if the choice of filing is influenced by a large creditor (usually the DIP-lender-to-be), and this
lender wants to have many exit possibilities, venues other than the Southern District will be more
appealing.
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Enron will also affect the liquidity and pricing of different types and sizes of bankruptcy
claims differently. Enron increases the value of claims that travel with subordination indemnities or
warranties, like loan participation claims, relative to those that do not, like bonds and trade claims,
although one has to question what these indemnities and warranties are worth in light of the expense
that would be involved in litigating them. It will increase the relative value of diversified synthetic
instruments like securitizations and may encourage the development of securitized bundles of
bankruptcy claims. It also places new emphasis on the creditworthiness of the indemnitor. Claims
purchasers will now have cause to look into seller’s finances, or take out insurance, in the form of
credit default swaps on the seller, adding transaction costs to deals, which will decrease the marginal
number of deals.
It is unclear how Enron will affect claims trading in terms of size of claims purchases. Most
likely, it will make small claims less liquid.

Some claims purchasers may choose to protect

themselves from subordination risk by diversifying to minimize the impact of any particular
subordination. This strategy would call for purchasing smaller claims. Yet, distressed investors
often invest to achieve negotiating leverage and shape the outcome of a reorganization plan or gain
an advantage in the sale of an estate asset. In such situations, a small claim is of limited value, as it
will provide insufficient leverage. Enron alters the dynamics of the bankruptcy claims market,
which is an essential part of the health of all capital markets.
2. Credit Default Swaps
Enron increases counterparty risk in the derivative market in credit default swaps. Credit
default swaps are an OTC derivative that insures against a borrower’s default through the sale of the
default risk separate from ownership of the loan.182 A lender (the protection buyer) enters into a
credit default swap with a party (the protection seller) that promises to purchase the loan at par if the
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borrower (the reference entity) defaults during the typically short-term duration of the swap contract.
Thus, if bank X is worried about a loan made to Enron, it could enter into a credit default swap with
bank Y, which would have to pay X the par value of the loan upon default, and Y would become the
owner of the defaulted loan. More typically, X would retain ownership of the loan, and would
instead purchase Enron bonds with a face value equal to that of the loan, which it would then transfer
to Y. In perfect market conditions, the market value of the bonds will be the same as that of the loan
itself.183 Credit default swaps give lenders the ability to transform low quality debt into high quality
debt by substituting the default risk of the swap counterparty for that of the reference debtor.184
If bank Y has to investigate every party with which it enters into credit default swaps to
determine that they are not a “bad actor” in relation to the borrower, it will raise the price of credit
default swaps, and thus the cost of borrowing, which will in turn prevent some otherwise beneficial
transactions from occurring. Credit default swaps have grown into a major OTC derivatives market
in the past decade. At the end of 2005, there were $17.1 trillion in notional outstandings for credit
default swaps.185 Credit default swaps are important for the liquidity of the bankruptcy claims
market because they provide an exit market for small bondholders, whose positions are purchased by
protection buyers to cover their swap obligations. The availability of credit default swaps also helps
creditors limit their lending exposure, thereby lowering costs to borrowers. Not only does Enron
increase the cost of raising capital by restricting liquidity in the bankruptcy claims market, it does so
too by raising the cost of credit insurance devices like credit default swaps.
3. Loan Participations
Enron also creates problems for loan participations. The standardized loan participation
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transfer documentation only includes upstream chains of title,186 warranties of good behavior187 and
non-impairment,188 or indemnities189 for the transfer of distressed loans. Loans trading at par or near
par (to approximately 90 cents on the dollar) lack such protections. The distressed loan market is
less liquid because of purchaser protections, and this hurts distressed companies’ ability to raise
capital and makes bankruptcies more likely.
Purchaser protections, including chains of title, on a distressed loan participation extend only
to the time the loan began to trade using distressed documentation.190 Most debt does not begin its
life as distressed, so the purchaser of distressed debt can only trace chains of title up to the time that
the debt became distressed. The purchaser has no guarantees regarding the behavior of prior holders
when the debt was not distressed. In the case of Enron, the Short Term Credit Agreement was not
distressed debt when issued. Had Fleet sold its share of the participation when it was still trading at
par, the Funds might never have known that Fleet had held the participation, much less been able to
conduct diligence on Fleet.
Of course, one could change the practices of loan participation trading to make par loans
186

Upstream transactions are covered by the following provision in the standard forms of the Loan Syndication &
Trading Association (LSTA). If the transaction is a secondary assignment, the seller
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trade with the same standardized protections as distressed debt.

This would decrease the par

market’s liquidity, and there would be a problematic transition period. The exact liquidity impact is
hard to gauge, but it appears that many claims trades fail because of an unwillingness to agree on
purchaser protections because both parties are risk adverse. As Chaim Fortgang and Thomas Moers
Mayer have noted, “The importance of such representations, warranties and indemnities should not
be underestimated. Failure to agree on these provisions has destroyed a surprisingly large number of
deals after claims buyers and claims sellers agreed on economic terms.”191 Equitable subordination
is traditionally a rare and unusual remedy,192 but one that parties would nonetheless want protection
against because it can result in a total loss.
Enron correctly noted that, in theory, the market price for bankruptcy claims should adjust
itself to address this risk.193 The bankruptcy claims market, like the credit default swap and loan
participation markets, is made up of extremely sophisticated players, who can protect themselves via
pricing, insurance, and derivatives. Still, one has to wonder whether the market can properly
discount for the risk of subordination. Parties’ natural risk aversion may lead to imperfect pricing,
causing otherwise mutually beneficially transactions to fail, and thereby restricting liquidity in the
claims market and thus the ability of distressed companies to raise capital.194 This is yet another way
that Enron raises the cost of raising capital and increases financial distress for troubled companies.
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4. The Slippery Slope to All Capital Market Transactions
Enron also creates a slippery slope that could increase counterparty risk on capital market
transactions. Enron noted that it also applied to pre-petition agreements to purchase a bankruptcy
claim:
. . . based on the Court’s previous analysis, no legal or policy basis supports the
premise that transferees of bonds or notes should be treated differently than those
holding the transferred loan claims. All post-petition transferees assume the risk that
their claims may be subject to subordination . . . . a party who enters into a prepetition agreement under which such party agrees to accept a transfer of proofs of
claim in the event of the bankruptcy of a party to such agreement should fair no better
tha[n] a post-petition purchaser of claims.195
At first glance, this dictum is very sensible. As long as the purchaser is aware that he is purchasing
bankruptcy claims, it should not matter whether he agreed to purchase them before or after a
bankruptcy petition was filed. The purchaser has consciously assumed the same risks in both cases
and therefore should be treated the same.
The problem with extending Enron to pre-petition agreements to purchase bankruptcy claims
is that a pre-petition agreement to purchase bankruptcy claims is difficult to distinguish from a
normal pre-petition debt purchase. A pre-petition debt purchase always includes the purchase of a
potential bankruptcy claim if the debtor goes bankrupt. In the case of distressed debt (or equity in a
failing company) the likelihood of the debt or equity becoming a bankruptcy claim or interest is
high. Why should a vulture fund that purchases distressed debt on the eve of bankruptcy be treated
differently than another fund that purchases claims post-petition or one that arranges pre-petition to
purchase claims post-petition? The intervening formality of a bankruptcy filing is not a good enough
reason for disparate treatment.
Once Enron is extended to pre-petition agreements to purchase bankruptcy claims, it
becomes difficult to differentiate it from any other pre-petition debt purchase or, for that matter,
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from pre-petition securities or derivatives purchases. Enron’s trajectory implicates all capital market
transactions, and in publicly traded markets, diligence is simply impossible; indeed, that is why
publicly traded securities are negotiable instruments, although query whether that status provides
protection from subordination. Whether a court would ever countenance the subordination of a
purchaser of publicly traded security or derivative for the unrelated behavior of a virtually
anonymous prior holder is doubtful, but Enron sets the table for such a subordination, and no
creditor wants to be the test case.196
So far, there has not been a noticeable market change in response to Enron, but that may
change if it is upheld on appeal. Diligence is likely to increase as to past holders’ identities and
dealings with the debtor and as to sellers’ financial ability to make good on warranties or
indemnities. Purchase negotiations are likely to focus more on indemnities, warranties, and sureties.
Insurance, derivatives, and structured finance solutions designed to hedge against subordination may
even appear. And concerned creditors are likely to seek waivers of subordination or file declaratory
judgment actions, both of which would impose costs on bankruptcy estates. Until Enron’s limits are
clarified or the decision is overturned, it will create uncertainty throughout financial markets.
C. REFCO: EARLY EVIDENCE OF THE EFFECTS OF ENRON
Developments in the Refco bankruptcy provide an early look at how Enron is playing out in
market behavior and show how seriously Enron has affected the claims trading market. Refco shows
that subordination risk is treated as qualitatively different from the regular business risks against
which sophisticated actors like claims traders routinely protect themselves.
Refco was a financial services company that ran a major commodities and futures brokerage.
In October 2005, shortly after Refco’s IPO, its newly hired controller discovered that Refco’s CEO
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and chairman had hidden some $430 million in bad debts from the company’s auditors and investors.
These debts had been hidden by arranging for Refco to make quarterly loans to other financial
institutions, which would then reloan the money to a company controlled by Refco’s CEO that was
named to appear as if it were a Refco subsidiary. This false subsidiary would then purchase the bad
debts from Refco, using Refco’s own money in effect. On Refco’s books, it appeared as if Refco
was had an asset in the form of loans to creditworthy, independent financial institutions, so Refco
was able to avoid acknowledging and writing off the bad debts, which would have left Refco with
negative equity.
Refco filed for bankruptcy on October 17, 2005. One of the intermediary institutions, the
Austrian bank BAWAG, filed various bankruptcy claims against Refco.

In April 2006, as

BAWAG’s involvement in Refco’s fraud came out, Refco’s creditors filed suit against BAWAG,
creating a situation similar to Enron, in which a claimant was accused of injuring other claimants.197
Enron expected claims potentially tainted by an inequitable creditor to continue trading with an
appropriate risk discount.198 This is not what occurred in Refco.
As soon as there was rumor of BAWAG’s alleged misdeeds, all claims that had ever passed
through BAWAG’s hands became radioactive, before the other Refco creditors filed suit against
BAWAG. No one would purchase them for any price because of the fear of subordination or
disallowance.199 The fear of BAWAG claims was so great that reputable financial institutions took
the drastic step of refusing to close confirmed trades in BAWAG-tainted claims.200 Holders of
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BAWAG claims found themselves unable to unload their positions or to mark the claims to market
because there was no market for these claim.201

Even if these purchasers had bargained for

indemnities, they could not collect them because no subordination had yet occurred.202 Purchasers
that expected to be short-term claim holders found themselves trapped in positions of uncertain
duration.203
Normally in a commoditized market like bankruptcy claims trading, a situation like
BAWAG’s creates a profit-rich opportunity that some party will have the risk appetite to explore;
BAWAG claims would be so heavily discounted that there was much more profit potential. At least
one major financial institution, which has requested to remain anonymous, closely considered buying
the BAWAG claims for precisely this reason and had its attorneys examine the matter. In light of
Enron, the attorneys could not get comfortable enough to sign off on a deal. The subordination risk
was too great for the financial institution to purchase the claims, regardless of the price. Indeed,
because there were questions about BAWAG’s own financial stability, the possibility of recourse
against BAWAG in the event of a subordination was of little comfort to the potential purchaser.
What the Refco shows is that Enron is not a sui generis problem. As Enron plays itself out in
more cases, the market will take the subordination risk much more seriously. Moreover, Fleet and
BAWAG were, relatively speaking, small players. If an agent bank, lead underwriter, or market
maker is alleged to have acted inequitably in a future bankruptcy, it could affect a far greater
percentage of the total dollar amount of claims on the debtor. Although bankruptcy claims traders’
business involves protecting against possible risks, equitable subordination is one that these
sophisticated market players are unwilling to chance, in part because of the soft, discretionary nature
of the action. Market behavior shows that Enron counterparty risk is qualitatively different from
swaps on BAWAG’s debt. Of course, if BAWAG did not default, but simply disputed its liability to purchasers of the
subordinated debt the credit default swaps would probably not be triggered.
201
Id.
202
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other risks.
There is a coda to Refco that raises an intriguing subsidiary question. BAWAG settled its
claims with the Refco creditors, the Department of Justice, and the SEC for $675 million, half of
which will go to the bankruptcy estate.204 BAWAG admitted to involvement in some of Refco’s
schemes.205 The settlement includes mutual releases—Refco will drop its claims on the bankruptcy
estate, and the estate and creditors will drop their claims against Refco. This still leaves open the
fate of claims purchased from BAWAG between Refco’s bankruptcy filing in October 2005, and the
market freeze on BAWAG claims in April 2006. Does the release of BAWAG cleanse its claims?
Or are the purchasers still on the hook under Enron? The question is troubling. Arguably, since
BAWAG only released the claims it still had against Refco, Refco’s release should only be construed
as extending to BAWAG itself. BAWAG claims purchasers should garner no protection from the
settlement. But the settlement is also intended to make Refco and its creditors whole. Thus, if the
settlement were in satisfaction of any injury inflicted by BAWAG, subordination of BAWAG claims
purchasers under Enron would be a punitive action that would result in a windfall to other creditors.
The extent of Enron counterparty risk is only beginning to become apparent.
D. MARKET MANIPULATION RISK IN CLAIMS TRADING
The drastic market reaction to Enron counterparty risk creates an inverse counterparty risk in
which sellers must fear buyers. Enron has created the possibility of market manipulation through a
variant of the “short-and-distort,” a mirror image “pump-and-dump.” A potential claims purchaser
could easily manipulate the claims market to achieve a bargain purchase by putting out word of
inequitable behavior by claims’ originator(s), who would themselves not be harmed unless they were
still claimholders. A potential purchaser would not have to state any false facts; implications and
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suggestions could well do the job. As Refco shows, even without filing a lawsuit, mere innuendo of
creditor impropriety could cause a sharp decline in any claims that had potentially been held by that
creditor. Indeed, Refco shows that the claims would become unsellable . . . except to the party that
originated the rumor, which would swoop in to buy at a steep discount.
While a “short-and-distort” stratagem is possible in all markets, it would be far more
effective in the claims trading market. OTC markets like claims trading lack price stabilizers like
specialists and market makers. Additionally, in a regular market, negative information about a
security will cause the security’s price to fall, but it will not usually result in a cessation of trading.
Moreover, negative information about a publicly traded company’s operations is usually verifiable:
Did earnings meet expectations?

Did a clinical trial fail?

Has a government investigation

commenced? These are black-and-white questions. It is much harder to answer whether a company
acted so inequitably that its claims will be subject to subordination.
The most important distinction from other markets, though, is that existing law does not
protect claims sellers from a short-and-distort. Federal or state securities laws have not been applied
to bankruptcy claims trading to date, although that could change,206 and classic common law fraud
does not cover a short-and-distort.

In the typical fraud situation, the seller makes the

misrepresentation to the purchaser. In a bankruptcy claim short-and-distort, it is the purchaser that
makes misrepresentations. Moreover, these representations are never directly to the seller and never
in the context of transaction negotiations. A seller to a distorter would not be able to recover its loss
under securities laws or common law.
Nor would equitable subordination or claim disallowance be adequate remedies for a seller to
a distorter. While these remedies would have a deterrent effect against distortion, they would only
punish the purchaser. Subordination and disallowance do not compensate the seller, and they create
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a windfall for other creditors. There are no clear means of legal redress for the seller in a short-anddistort. At best, the seller could bring an action for unjust enrichment, but that is a hard case to make
in an arms-length transaction between two sophisticated parties. As claims traders start to realize the
market manipulation risk created by Enron, the liquidity of the claims trading market is likely to
further contract, because sellers must now also be aware of buyers. Enron counterparty risk has thus
come full circle, to where buyers are afraid of sellers and sellers are afraid of buyers.
VI. REDISCOVERING THE VIRTUES OF NEGOTIABILITY
A. WHY NEGOTIABILITY STILL MATTERS
Enron was an erroneous decision from doctrinal and policy perspectives. It has serious
negative market consequences on that are only beginning to become apparent. The key lesson from
Enron is the continuing importance of negotiability. For years, scholars have argued that at best,
negotiability doesn’t matter any more, or that it is even harmful.207 It has been out of vogue with
scholars for several decades, although the study of negotiability systems used to occupy some of the
brightest stars in the American legal firmament: Story, Ames, Gilmore.208
Enron, however, shows that this fossilized branch of the law still matters today in ways no
one previously realized. It also raises questions about when negotiability, rather than nemo dat,
should be the default rule and what the requirements for negotiability should be. Traditionally, these
questions were answered in reference to the type of property interest involved.209 Some level of
negotiability was imputed to bills of exchange and goods because these moved in the commercial
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world where parties were presumably more sophisticated and able to protect themselves and where
liquidity was important.210

Choses in action—legal claims for money—which would include

consumer debts, remained a nemo dat system because of concern for consumers losing defenses
because of an assignment.211 As new markets have arisen, however, the traditional property type
divisions no longer accurately reflect a consumer/commercial divide. The remainder of this article
considers how the law of property transfers should address evolving commercial reality in reference
to bankruptcy claims.
B. CAN A BANKRUPTCY CLAIM BE NEGOTIABLE?
Negotiability is a creature of state law. Typically, UCC Article 3 determines an obligation’s
negotiability.212 Fleet’s participation in the credit agreements with Enron was not a negotiable debt.
A line of credit like those extended to Enron cannot met UCC Article 3's requirements because, at
the very least, it does not involve a sum certain.213 Would it have mattered, though, if the debt
underlying the claims purchased by the Funds was negotiable under UCC Article 3? Would Enron
have applied to claims based on negotiable debts? If so, then a bankruptcy claim can never be
negotiable. If not, Enron would mean that what is negotiable at state law remains negotiable in
bankruptcy.
Enron’s ruling that the Funds could not be good faith purchasers because they were
purchasing bankruptcy claims214 means that negotiability under state law is not honored in
210
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bankruptcy. Although the claims might have been negotiable, negotiability has no meaning if there
cannot be a good faith purchaser. Enron imposed a different standard of good faith for the purchase
of a bankruptcy claim than for the purchase of the underlying debt. The original UCC, still in force
in forty-six states, defines good faith as “honesty in fact,”215 while the revised UCC, adopted by
three states so far, defines it as “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing.”216 In either case, the Funds would have easily qualified as good faith
purchasers. Enron means that state law treatment of negotiability and good faith does not carry over
into bankruptcy.
As a general matter, though, state law property rights are respected in bankruptcy. As the
Supreme Court noted in Butner v. United States, “Property interests are created and defined by state
law. Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests
should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy
proceeding.”217 Thus, security interests, determined by UCC Article 9—state law—are given force
in bankruptcy, albeit with some limitations.218 It makes little sense, then, that UCC Article 3’s
definition of certain property interests would not also be respected in bankruptcy.
Butner failed to recognized, however, that not all property rights are creations of state law.
Some property rights, like copyrights, patents, and federal judgments, are creations only of federal
law. Likewise, bankruptcy claims involve property rights that are the creation of federal, not state
law.219 A bankruptcy claim is different from the underlying debt. The Bankruptcy Code’s definition
of “claim” is broader than a debt. The Code defines a “claim” as a
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
215
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equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to
a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to
judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or
unsecured.220
A claim includes disputed, contingent, and unliquidated payment obligations. Thus, a bankruptcy
claim does not need an underlying enforceable pre-petition debt. Nor does simply holding a debt
create a bankruptcy claim. A claim must be timely filed with the court,221 and post-petition transfers
of the claim must also be registered with the court.222
A bankruptcy claim also differs from a pre-petition debt in terms of the relationships it
implicates. The voting system for Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 plans223 means that creditors are not
simply in a bilateral relationship with the debtor. Instead, they become part of a multilateral
involuntary community of creditors, so claims trades and the relative priority of claims have an
impact on third parties. The relational aspect of a bankruptcy claim, as well as its more expansive
definition and filing requirements, distinguish it from a pre-petition debt.
Finally, while the property rights involved in a debt are a product of state law, there are
additional rights that vest in a bankruptcy claim that exist only as a matter of federal law. A
bankruptcy claim entitles its holder to plan disclosure and voting rights, distribution rights, and rights
to bring actions under Bankruptcy Code provisions. To be sure, a pre-petition obligation also
includes a package of bankruptcy rights,224 but those rights attach as a matter of federal, not state
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law. Federal bankruptcy law displaces state collection law upon the granting of an order for relief.225
Therefore, it should not matter whether the debt underlying a bankruptcy claim was negotiable or
not. Federal law should govern the treatment of bankruptcy claims.
Enron mandated a uniform federal rule of non-negotiability of bankruptcy claims that means
state law negotiability status has no impact in bankruptcy because there cannot be good faith claims
purchasers to benefit from negotiability’s protections. While Enron was correct in intuiting that
federal law should govern the transfer of bankruptcy claims, it erred in what that law should be, and
that error has had significant negative impacts on capital markets. This article proposes a federal law
of negotiability for corporate bankruptcy claims that will overturn Enron and protect the liquidity of
the corporate bankruptcy claims market.226
C. A PROPOSED FEDERAL LAW OF NEGOTIABILITY FOR BANKRUPTCY CLAIMS
A federal law of negotiability for bankruptcy claims could be accomplished in three ways.
First, § 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code could be amended to include § 510(c) in its list of actions for
which § 550(b) provides a good faith purchaser defense. A legislative solution would have the
virtues of being immediate and uniform. Alternatively, either Congress or the courts could define
bankruptcy claims could be as securities, which would lend them negotiability, but would impose
onerous regulatory burdens on the market.
A third way would be for courts to craft a federal common law of negotiability of bankruptcy
claims. Because Congress has not addressed the issue directly, there is room of the courts to create a
federal common law of bankruptcy claims trading that presumes negotiability of claims, regardless
of formalities.227 Indeed, Enron itself was federal common lawmaking.
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Federal common law would not yield immediate or necessarily uniform results. But it might
produce a more nuanced rule over time than a legislative solution. The danger of codification of
negotiable instrument law, as Grant Gilmore recognized, is that codification frequently becomes “a
strait jacket to confine” new types of commercial activity.228
The proposed rule would presume good faith in most bankruptcy claims purchases under an
“honesty in fact and reasonable standards of commercial dealing” standard like the revised UCC.229
The exceptions to this presumption would be claims trading by fiduciaries of the estate, resalesellbacks, and situations in which the claims’ purchaser had acquired the claims along with
substantially all assets of the former holder. For good faith claims purchasers, the rule would cut-off
other “personal” defenses and attacks, including equitable subordination, by other creditors and the
estate against good faith purchasers of bankruptcy claims.
The proposed rule would not cut off the estate’s defenses with the filing of a bankruptcy
petition. Rather, if the claim is based on what was a negotiable debt at state law, then those state law
protections should continue to apply to a creditor who acquired the claim before bankruptcy. Thus,
if a creditor who acquired a pre-petition would be a holder in due course under state law, he should
have the same protection under bankruptcy law. On the other hand, if the creditor purchased a nonnegotiable debt pre-bankruptcy, he should not get the protections of a holder in due course, even if
he would qualify had the debt been negotiable at state law. The post-petition transferee of either of
these creditors, however, should take the claim free of personal defenses, to which equitable
subordination may be added.
The proposed rule would not require any formalities for negotiability to attach. A federal
rule of negotiability for bankruptcy claims would dispense with the need to make claims conform to
formal requirements. UCC Article 3’s formal requirements are designed to provide notice of the
228
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negotiable status of the debt. No such notice is needed, however, in a market occupied solely by
sophisticated players, like bankruptcy claims trading. If there is a bright-line rule, the parties will be
aware of it. Thus, even reification, the merger of the debt and the instrument, which has traditionally
been the crucial step for negotiability,230 is not needed. Indeed, as Ronald Mann has noted, “In this
modern age of multiple and rapid transactions in a national and perhaps global market,
negotiability’s emphasis on the physical document is a hindrance, rather than a benefit.”231
In the end, negotiability is not about reification, so much as it is about what defenses travel
with a claim. This has gotten lost in the formalist emphasis of UCC Article 3, the chief body of
negotiability law, which made reification the essential precondition for negotiability. Nearly thirty
years ago, Grant Gilmore observed that “Article 3 is a museum of antiquities—a treasure house
crammed full of ancient artifacts whose use and function have long since been forgotten. Another
function of codification . . . is to preserve the past, like a fly in amber.”232 Unfortunately, the
formalisms of negotiability make it easy to miss the forest for the trees. The concerns that animated
so much of past property transfer law—theft and forgery of instruments and indorsements—are
sideshows today. Indeed, with electronic transactions, reification simply is not possible.
Although the hallmark of negotiable instrument law has long been its formal requirements,
that need not be the case. Indeed, Gilmore, himself a skilled draftsman, observed that it would be
possible to draft a negotiable instrument law without reference to formal requisites.233 If codification
is the handmaiden of ossification, then it is to the living common law that we should look for
keeping commercial law in line with commercial practice.
Article 3 of the UCC provides a notable contrast to Article 2. UCC Article 2 was drafted
primarily by Karl Llewellyn. Llewellyn had “reverence, above all other judges, for Lord Mansfield,”
229
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the great 18th century English jurist.234 Lord Mansfield was particularly noted for using special
juries of merchants to determine prevailing commercial practices.235 As Edwin Rubin has noted, “In
the view of Llewellyn and his fellow realists, the law should be grounded on real business practices,
not formal concepts–precisely the approach that Mansfield championed.”236 This is best illustrated
in UCC 1-201(20)’s definition of “good faith” as “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing.”237 Article 3, however, does not contain such an attachment of
living commercial practice. As Rubin has observed, “The rules that both Original Article 3 and its
revision promulgate are Lord Mansfield’s, by and large, but his method of deriving such rules from
the commercial realities of the day has been forgotten.”238
Enron should cause us to rethink whether property transfer law needs to be revised in some
areas to keep up with commercial reality. In particular, we should ask whether the formalities of
Article 3 negotiability, including reification, make sense today. If their chief purpose is to give
notice that a particular legal rule applies, we should ask whether the market is already on notice of
that rule, especially in light of the high transaction costs to Article 3’s formal requirements. The
formal requirements of Article 3 make negotiability an opt-in system that is impractical for many
types of commercial transactions. The formalities required for Article 3 negotiability limit parties’
contracting choices; loosening the formal requirements of negotiability when it would not come at
the expense of obligors or assignees would allow for contracts to better reflect parties actual, more
nuanced preferences, rather than force an outdated binary choice upon them. While relatively few
commercial transaction are negotiable today, this does not mean that parties do not want the liquidity
benefits of negotiability, only that the costs of the statutory formalities are too high.
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The law has long evinced a preference for negotiability in commercial cases, particularly
when involving sophisticated parties because the liquidity benefits of negotiability outweigh its costs
to obligors in these cases since the obligors are capable of protecting themselves through pricing and
litigation.

As commercial markets develop, it is important that the proper property transfer

paradigm—negotiability or nemo dat—be applied, and that this application revolve around the
realities of the market, not outdated formalities.
Bankruptcy claims are a case where the social value of market liquidity greatly outweighs the
social interest in protecting obligors. This is because liquidity in the claims market affects the cost
of borrowing in all markets. Moreover, the obligor—the bankruptcy estate—is not really a party in
interest—only other creditors are, but, at least in theory, they all enjoy the possibility of higher resale
prices. The direct benefits of negotiability for bankruptcy claims will not accrue to all creditors
equally. Creditors with small claims—usually individuals with wage or benefit claims or tort
judgment claims—are unlikely to be able to sell their claims because the transaction costs are too
high for the additional control benefit. It will be large finance and trade creditors that reap the
benefits of negotiability in terms of increased resale price, while distressed debt investors—usually
sophisticated banks or hedge funds—will receive the benefit of claims with limited defenses. But
there is a larger social benefit that accrues to all creditors—the decreased bankruptcy risk of
borrowers because increased liquidity in the claims market will exert downward pressure on the cost
of capital outside of bankruptcy. A federal rule of negotiability for bankruptcy claims would ensure
a fair, efficient, and liquid market in bankruptcy claims that makes it easier for distressed companies
to raise funds and lower borrowers’ bankruptcy risks.
VI. CONCLUSION: EQUITY IS A ROGUISH THING
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Enron is cause to consider what risks one takes with an assignment, and whether those risks
should include equitable subordination for behavior by parties up the chain of assignment unrelated
to the assignment. Is it realistic to hold assignees responsible for investigating not just asset being
purchased or even the chain of assignment, but also the actions of previous holders unrelated to the
assignment? Such a requirement crimps liquidity and transparency in the bankruptcy claims market.
It is also unnecessary because creditors never rely on priority resulting from equitable subordination
in their decisions to extend value and can bring direct actions against the malfeasor if they or the
bankruptcy estate has been harmed.
Over four hundred years ago, John Selden observed that “Equity is a roguish thing.”239 But
equity is only roguish when it becomes detached from its guiding principles. Enron erred as a
doctrinal matter by failing to recognize that the law’s choice of property transfer system— nemo dat
or negotiability—is based on protection of justified reliance. As a policy matter, too, Enron erred,
by failing to recognize that hobbling of liquidity in the bankruptcy claims market has serious
spillover effects into other markets and raises the cost of credit for borrowers, which exacerbates
bankruptcy risk for creditors.
Enron is a reminder of the continuing value of negotiability in commercial contexts and the
need to keep the law of property transfers in sync with evolving commercial reality. Bankruptcy law
is still adjusting to the development of a large-scale claims trading market over the past two decades.
The problems of claims trading deserve serious consideration, but any attempt to regulate claims
trading needs to recognize the importance of the bankruptcy claims market for the economy as a
whole. A federal law of negotiability for bankruptcy claims would do so by protecting the liquidity
of a vital market and should be strongly considered by courts and Congress in the wake of Enron.
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